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Executive Summary 
Background 
 
The public debt crisis of Greece and other peripheral eurozone countries 
has the potential to harm the European Monetary Union. But the 
eurozone project has already inflicted damage onto Greece and other 
peripheral countries. There are two related reasons for the crisis: first, 
the skewed nature of monetary union and, second, the economic 
upheaval of 2007-9.   
Monetary union has removed or limited the freedom to set 
monetary and fiscal policy, thus forcing the pressures of economic 
adjustment onto the labour market. Guided by EU policy, eurozone 
countries have entered a „race to the bottom‟ encouraging flexibility, 
wage restraint, and part-time work. Labour has lost out to capital across 
the eurozone. The race has been won by Germany squeezing its workers 
hard in the aftermath of reunification. The eurozone has become an area 
of entrenched current account surpluses for Germany, financed by 
current account deficits for peripheral countries. Monetary union is a 
„beggar-thy-neighbour‟ policy for Germany, on condition that it beggars 
its own workers first.  
The crisis of 2007-9 compounded the predicament of peripheral 
countries because of the monetary and financial structures of the 
eurozone. The crisis resulted in extreme shortage of liquidity for 
European banks. The ECB intervened, lending freely and making it 
possible for banks to start dealing with their weak position. But ECB 
reaction was very different in 2009 when states faced growing borrowing 
needs due to the crisis. The eurozone left each state to fend for itself in 
the financial markets. The ECB watched as interest rates rose, financial 
institutions speculated against state debt, and state bankruptcy raised its 
head.   
Confronted with a public debt crisis, peripheral countries have 
been forced by the eurozone to impose harsh austerity. Yet, until early 
2010, they have received no bridging loans to ease the pressure. This is 
grossly damaging, and offers no assurances of future growth. In effect, 
peripheral countries have been forced to accept IMF conditionality, but 
without an IMF loan.  
Better policy alternatives are available, but they involve radical 
social and economic change. One option would be to reform the 
eurozone by relaxing fiscal constraints, introducing an enlarged 
European budget, guaranteeing a minimum wage, and providing 
unemployment insurance. A more radical alternative would be to exit 
from the eurozone, nationalising banks and other key areas of the 
economy as well as introducing industrial policy. Under all 
circumstances, peripheral countries face hard choices involving social 
conflict. 
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The mechanisms of crisis 
Gains for German capital, losses for German workers and periphery 
 
i. Monetary union has imposed fiscal rigidity, removed monetary 
independence, and forced economic adjustment through the 
labour market. Workers have lost share of output relative to 
capital in Germany and peripheral countries.  
ii. The German economy has performed poorly, with low growth, 
weak productivity gains, and high unemployment. But Germany 
has been able to keep down inflation as well as the nominal 
remuneration of labour. Peripheral countries have performed 
generally better, but labour costs and inflation have risen faster.  
iii. Germany has gained competitiveness within the eurozone for 
the sole reason that it has been able to squeeze its workers 
harder. Inevitably it has generated persistent current account 
surpluses against the periphery. The surpluses were turned into 
foreign direct investment and bank lending to the eurozone.  
Finance creates a crisis and then takes advantage of it 
 
iv. European banks faced a pressing need for liquidity after 2007. 
Banks also had to deal with the excesses of the preceding bubble. 
The ECB provided extraordinary volumes of liquidity, allowing 
banks to repair balance sheets by reducing lending, but thus 
intensified the recession. By 2009 bank lending was in retreat in 
the eurozone, and banks were not acquiring long-term securities. 
v. But during 2007-8 banks of core eurozone countries (Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium) had continued to lend to 
peripheral countries (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal). 
Gross cross-border claims from core to periphery reached 1.5 
trillion euro in 2008, representing almost three times the capital 
of core banks.  
vi. Peripheral and core states arrived in financial markets in 2009 
seeking extra funds of nearly one trillion euro because of the 
crisis. Public revenue had collapsed as the recession deepened, 
while public expenditure had risen to rescue finance and perhaps 
to maintain demand.  
vii. Thus, states appeared in financial markets at the „worst moment‟. 
With banks reluctant to lend, yields rose for all public debt. 
Financial capital was able to engage in speculative attacks on 
public debt of peripheral states, while the ECB watched. In 
short, European finance was rescued, only to turn and bite its 
rescuer.  
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Alternatives 
 
There are three strategic alternatives available to peripheral countries. 
 
1. The first is austerity accompanied with further liberalisation. This 
is the preferred choice of the eurozone and of the ruling elites 
across the periphery. It is also the worst option. It will achieve 
stabilisation through recession, imposing huge costs on working 
people. It offers little prospect of sustained growth in the future 
since productivity is expected to rise spontaneously following 
liberalisation. And it does not address the structural bias at the 
heart of the eurozone.  
 
2. The second is radical reform of the eurozone. It would involve 
greater fiscal freedom by member states; a substantially enlarged 
European budget; fiscal transfers from rich to poor; protection 
for employment; support for wages; and cross-European 
investment in sustainable industries. The strict regulations 
applying to ECB purchases of state debt would also be relaxed. 
This might be called the „good euro‟ option. Political problems 
aside, this strategy is likely to threaten the international role of 
the euro by leading to a fall in its value. It could thus threaten 
monetary union itself.  
 
3. The third is radical exit from the eurozone. There would be 
devaluation followed by cessation of payments and restructuring 
of debt. Banks would have to be nationalised and public control 
extended over utilities, transport, energy and 
telecommunications. Industrial policy would be introduced, 
including strategies to improve productivity. Infrastructure and 
environmentally sensitive investment could support equitable 
growth. This option requires a decisive shift in the balance of 
political power in favour of labour. To avoid veering toward 
national autarky peripheral countries would need to maintain 
access to international trade, technology and investment. 
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1. Several dimensions of a public debt crisis:  
The report condensed 
1.1. A crisis with deep roots  
 
The sovereign debt crisis that broke out in Greece at the end of 2009 is 
fundamentally due to the precarious integration of peripheral countries 
in the eurozone. Its immediate causes, however, lie with the crisis of 
2007-9. Speculative mortgage lending by US financial institutions, and 
trading of resultant derivative securities by international banks created a 
vast bubble in 2001-7, leading to crisis and recession. State provision of 
liquidity and capital in 2008-9 rescued the banks, while state expenditure 
prevented a worsening of the recession. The result in the eurozone was a 
sovereign debt crisis, exacerbated by the structural weaknesses of 
monetary union.    
The crisis of public debt, thus, represents Stage Two of an 
upheaval that started in 2007 and can be called a crisis of 
financialisation.1 Mature economies have become „financialised‟ during 
the last three decades resulting in growing weight of finance relative to 
production. Large corporations have come to rely less on banks, while 
becoming more engaged in financial markets. Households have become 
heavily involved in the financial system in terms of assets (pension and 
insurance) and liabilities (mortgage and unsecured debt). Banks have 
been transformed, seeking profits through fees, commissions and own 
trading, while rebalancing their activities toward households rather than 
corporations. Financial profit has emerged as a large part of total profit. 2  
But financialisation has unfolded in different ways across mature 
countries, including in the European Union. Germany has avoided the 
explosion of household debt that recently took place in other mature 
countries and peripheral eurozone countries. The performance of the 
German economy has been mediocre for many years, while great 
pressure has been applied on German workers‟ pay and conditions. The 
main source of growth for Germany has been its current account surplus 
within the eurozone, resulting from pressure on pay and conditions 
rather than superior productivity growth. This surplus has been recycled 
through foreign direct investment and German bank lending to 
peripheral countries and beyond. 
                                                          
1
 Financialisation has been extensively discussed by political economists. A useful, but not 
complete, survey can be found in van Treeck, T. 2009. The political economy debate on 
'financialization' - a macroeconomic perspective, Review of International Political Economy, 
16: 5, 907-944. The theoretical views underpinning this report can be found in C. Lapavitsas,  
2009. Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation, Historical Materialism, 
17:2, 114-148 and Dos Santos P. 2009. On the Content of Banking in Contemporary 
Capitalism, Historical Materialism, 17:2, 180-213.  
2
 See, for example: Krippner, G. 2005. The Financialization of the American Economy. Socio-
Economic Review, 3, 173-208; and Dumenil, G. & Levy, D. 2004. The Real and Financial 
Components of Profitability. Review of Radical Political Economics, 36, 82-110. 
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The implications for the eurozone have been severe. 
Financialisation in the periphery has proceeded within the framework of 
the monetary union and under the dominant shadow of Germany. 
Peripheral economies have acquired entrenched current account deficits. 
Growth has come from expansion of consumption financed by 
expanding household debt, or from investment bubbles characterised by 
real estate speculation. There has been a general rise of indebtedness, 
whether of households or corporations. Meanwhile, pressure has been 
applied to workers‟ pay and conditions across the periphery, but not as 
persistently as in Germany. The integration of peripheral countries in the 
eurozone has thus been precarious, leaving them vulnerable to the crisis 
of 2007-9 and eventually leading to the sovereign debt crisis.   
1.2 Institutional bias and malfunction in the eurozone 
 
The institutional mechanisms surrounding the euro have been an integral 
part of the crisis. To be more specific, European monetary union is 
supported by a host of treaties and multilateral agreements, including the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Growth and Stability Pact and the Lisbon 
Strategy. It is also supported by the European Central Bank, in charge of 
monetary policy across the eurozone. The combination of these 
institutions has produced a mix of monetary, fiscal, and labour market 
policies with powerful social implications.  
A single monetary policy has been applied across the eurozone. 
The ECB has targeted inflation and focused exclusively on the domestic 
value of money. To attain this target the ECB has taken cognisance of 
conditions primarily in core countries rather than assigning equal weight 
to all. In practice this has meant low interest rates across the eurozone. 
Further, the ECB has operated deficiently since it has not been allowed 
to acquire and manage state debt. And nor has it actively opposed 
financial speculation against member states. Yet, the ECB has emerged 
as protector of financial interests and guarantor of financialisation in the 
eurozone. 
Fiscal policy has been placed under the tight constraints of the 
Stability Pact, though considerable residual sovereignty has remained 
with member states. Fiscal discipline has been vital to the acceptability of 
the euro as international reserve, thus allowing the euro to act as world 
money. Since it lacks a unitary state and polity, the eurozone has not had 
an integrated tax system or fiscal transfers between areas. In practice, 
fiscal rules have been applied with some laxity in core countries and 
elsewhere. Peripheral countries have attempted to disguise budget 
deficits in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, fiscal stringency has prevailed 
during this period.  
Given these constraints, national competitiveness within the 
eurozone has depended on the conditions of work and the performance 
of labour markets, and in this regard EU policy has been unambiguous. 
The European Employment Strategy has encouraged greater flexibility of 
employment as well as more part-time and temporary work. There has 
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been considerable pressure on pay and conditions, a race to the bottom 
across the eurozone. The actual application of this policy across the 
eurozone has varied considerably, depending on welfare systems, trade 
union organisation, and social and political history. 
It is apparent that the institutions of the eurozone are more than 
plain technical arrangements to support the euro as domestic common 
currency as well as world money. Rather, they have had profound social 
and political implications. They have protected the interests of financial 
capital by lowering inflation, fostering liberalisation, and ensuring rescue 
operations in times of crisis. They have also worsened the position of 
labour compared to capital. Not least, they have facilitated the 
domination of the eurozone by Germany at the expense of peripheral 
countries. 
1.3 Peripheral countries in the shadow of Germany  
 
Peripheral countries joined the euro at generally high rates of exchange 
presumably to control inflation, thus signing away some of their 
competitiveness at the outset. Since monetary policy has been set by the 
ECB and fiscal policy has been constrained by the Stability Pact, 
peripheral countries were encouraged to improve competitiveness 
primarily by applying pressure on their workers. But they have faced two 
major problems in this regard. First, real wages and welfare states are 
generally worse in the periphery than the core of the eurozone. The 
scope for gains in competitiveness through pressure on workers is 
correspondingly less. Second, Germany has been unrelenting in 
squeezing its own workers throughout this period. During the last two 
decades, the most powerful economy of the eurozone has produced the 
lowest increases in nominal labour costs, while its workers have 
systematically lost share of output. European monetary union has been 
an ordeal for German workers. 
German competitiveness has thus risen further within the 
eurozone. The result has been a structural current account surplus for 
Germany, mirrored by current account deficits for peripheral countries. 
This surplus has been the only source of dynamism for the German 
economy throughout the 2000s. In terms of output, employment, 
productivity, investment, consumption, and so on, German performance 
has been mediocre. Thus, at the core of the eurozone lies an economy 
that delivers growth through current account surpluses deriving in large 
part from the arrangements of the euro. German surpluses, meanwhile, 
have been translated into capital exports - primarily bank lending and 
foreign direct investment - the main recipient of which has been the 
eurozone, including the periphery. 
This is not to imply that workers in peripheral countries have 
avoided pressures on pay and conditions. Indeed, the share of labour in 
output has declined across the periphery. It is true that the remuneration 
of labour has increased in nominal and real terms in the periphery, but 
productivity has risen by more - and generally faster than in Germany. 
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But conditions within the eurozone have not encouraged rapid and 
sustained productivity growth in peripheral countries, partly due to 
middling levels of technology, with the exception of Ireland. Peripheral 
countries have thus lost competitiveness as the nominal compensation of 
German workers has remained practically stagnant throughout the 
period.  
Confronted with a sluggish but competitive Germany, peripheral 
countries have opted for growth strategies that reflected their own 
history, politics and social structure. Greece and Portugal sustained high 
levels of consumption, while Ireland and Spain had investment booms 
that involved real estate speculation. Across the periphery, household 
debt rose as interest rates fell. The financial system expanded its weight 
and presence across the economy. But in 2009-10 it became apparent 
that these strategies were incapable of producing long-term results. 
The integration of peripheral countries in the eurozone has been 
precarious as well as rebounding in favour of Germany. The sovereign 
debt crisis has its roots in this underlying reality rather than in public 
profligacy in peripheral countries. When the crisis of 2007-9 hit the 
eurozone, the structural weaknesses of monetary union emerged 
violently, taking the form of a public debt crisis for Greece, and 
potentially for other peripheral countries.  
 
1.4 The impact of the crisis of 2007-9 and the role of finance 
 
The immediate causes of the crisis of 2007-9 lay in the US mortgage 
bubble which became global due to securitisation of subprime assets. 
European banks began to face liquidity problems after August 2007, and 
German banks in particular found that they were heavily exposed to 
problematic, subprime-related securities. During the first phase of the 
crisis, core eurozone banks continued to lend heavily to peripheral 
borrowers in the mistaken belief that they were a safe outlet. Net 
exposure rose substantially in 2008. 
But reality had changed dramatically for banks as liquidity 
became increasingly scarce in 2008, particularly after the „rescue‟ of Bear 
Sterns in early 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers six months 
later. To rescue banks, the ECB engaged in extensive liquidity provision, 
accepting many and debatable types of paper as collateral for secure 
debt. ECB actions allowed banks to begin to adjust their balance sheet, 
engaging in deleveraging. By late 2008 banks were already reducing their 
lending, including to the periphery. Banks also stopped buying long-term 
securities preferring to hold short-term instruments - backed by the ECB 
- with a view to improving liquidity. The result was credit shortage and 
accelerated recession across the eurozone, including the periphery. 
These were the conditions under which states – both core and 
periphery of the eurozone but also the UK and other states – began to 
seek additional loanable funds in financial markets. A major cause of 
rising state borrowing was the decline of public revenue as recession 
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lowered the tax intake. State expenditure also rose in several countries 
after 2007 as the rescuing of banks proved expensive, and to a lesser 
extent as states attempted to support aggregate demand. Accelerated 
public borrowing in 2009 was induced by the crisis, and hence by the 
earlier speculations of the financial system. In this respect, the Greek 
state was typical of several others, including the USA and the UK. 
In the conditions of financial markets in 2009, with the banks 
reluctant to lend, the rising supply of state paper put upward pressure on 
yields. Thus, speculators found an environment conducive to their 
activities. In the past, similar pressures in financial markets would have 
led to speculative attacks on currencies and collapsing exchange rates for 
the heavy borrowers. But this was obviously impossible within the 
eurozone, and hence speculative pressures appeared as falling prices of 
sovereign debt.  
Speculators focused on Greek public debt on account of the 
country‟s large and entrenched current account deficit as well as because 
of the small size of the market in Greek public bonds. Credibility was 
also lost by the Greek government because of systematic fiddling of 
national statistics to reduce the size of budget deficits. But the broader 
significance of the Greek crisis was not due to the inherent importance 
of the country. Rather, Greece represented potentially the start of 
speculative attacks on other peripherals - and even on countries beyond 
the eurozone, such as the UK - that faced expanding public debt.  
The Greek crisis, therefore, is symptomatic of a wider malaise. It 
is notable that the institutions of the eurozone, above all the central 
bank, have performed badly in this context. For the ECB private banks 
were obviously „too big to fail‟ in 2007-9, meriting extraordinary 
provision of liquidity. But there was no similar sensitivity toward 
peripheral countries that found themselves in dire straits. It made little 
difference that the problems of public debt were largely caused by the 
crisis as well as by the very actions of the ECB in providing banks with 
liquidity.  
To be sure the ECB has been hamstrung by its statutes which 
prevent it from directly acquiring public debt. But this is yet more 
evidence of the ill-conceived and biased nature of European monetary 
union. A well-functioning central bank would not have simply sat and 
watched while speculators played destabilising games in financial 
markets. At the very least, it would have deployed some of its ingenuity, 
as the ECB generously did when private banks needed liquidity in 2007-
9. And nor would it have decided what types of paper to accept as 
collateral on the basis of ratings provided by the discredited private 
organisations that were instrumental to the bubble of 2001-7.    
1.5 Policy options for peripheral countries 
 
The crisis is so severe that there are neither soft options, nor easy 
compromises for peripheral countries. The choices are stark, similar to 
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those of developing countries confronted with repeated crises during the 
last three decades.  
The first alternative is to adopt austerity by cutting wages, 
reducing public spending and raising taxes, in the hope of reducing 
public borrowing requirements. Austerity would probably have to be 
accompanied by bridging loans, or guarantees by core countries to bring 
down commercial borrowing rates. It is likely that there would also be 
„structural reform‟, including further labour market flexibility, tougher 
pension conditions, privatisation of remaining public enterprises, 
privatisation of education, and so on. The aim of such liberalisation 
would presumably be to raise the productivity of labour, thus improving 
competitiveness.  
This is the preferred alternative of ruling elites across peripheral 
and core countries, since it shifts the burden of adjustment onto working 
people. But there are several imponderables. The first is the opposition 
of workers to austerity, leading to political unrest. Further, the eurozone 
lacks established mechanisms both to provide bridging loans and to 
enforce austerity on peripheral members. There is also strong political 
opposition within core countries to rescuing others within the eurozone. 
On the other hand, the option of forcing a peripheral country to seek 
recourse to the IMF would be damaging for the eurozone as a whole. 
Yet, despite apparent legal constraints, it is not beyond the EU to 
find ways of advancing bridging loans, at the same time enforcing 
austerity through political pressure. The real problem with this option is 
not the institutional machinery of the eurozone. It is, rather, that the 
policy is likely to lead to aggravated recession in peripheral countries 
making it even more difficult to meet public borrowing targets. Poverty, 
inequality and social division will increase substantially. Even worse, it is 
unlikely that there will be long-term increases in productivity through a 
strategy of liberalisation. Productivity increases require investment and 
new technologies, neither of which will be provided spontaneously by 
liberalised markets.  
Peripheral countries would probably find themselves lodged in 
an unequal competitive struggle against Germany, whose workers would 
continue to be severely squeezed. Attempting to remain within the 
eurozone by adopting austerity and liberalisation would lead to sustained 
falls in real wages in the vain hope of reversing current account deficits 
against Germany. The eurozone as a whole, meanwhile, would continue 
to be faced with a weaker world economy due to the crisis of 2007-9. It 
is a grim prospect for working people in the periphery, and far from a 
bed of roses for German workers.  
The second alternative is to reform the eurozone. There is 
almost universal agreement that unitary monetary policy and fragmented 
fiscal policy have been a dysfunctional mix. There is also widespread 
criticism of the ECB for the way it has provided abundant liquidity to 
banks, while keeping aloof of borrowing states, even to the extent of 
ignoring speculative attacks. A range of reforms that would not challenge 
the fundamentals of the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability Pact, and the 
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Lisbon agenda might well be possible. The aim would be to produce 
smoother interaction of monetary and fiscal forces, while maintaining 
the underlying conservatism of the eurozone. 
There is very little in such reforms that would be attractive to 
working people, or that would indeed deal with the structural imbalances 
within the eurozone. Hence there have been calls for more radical 
reforms, including abolition of the Stability Pact and altering the statutes 
of the ECB to allow it regularly to lend to member states. The aim of 
such reform would be to retain monetary union, while creating a „good 
euro‟ that would be beneficial to working people. The „good euro‟ 
strategy would involve significantly expanding the European budget to 
deliver fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries. There would be an 
active European investment strategy to support new areas of economic 
activity. There would also be a minimum wage policy, reducing 
differentials in competitiveness, and lowering inequality across the 
eurozone.  
The „good euro‟ strategy, appealing as it sounds, would face two 
major problems. The first is that the eurozone lacks a unitary state, and 
there is no prospect of acquiring one in the near future, certainly not 
with the required progressive disposition. The current machinery of the 
eurozone is entirely unsuited to this task. The strategy would face a 
continuous conflict between, on the one hand, its ambitious pan-
European aims and, on the other, the absence of state mechanisms that 
could begin to turn these aims into reality.  
More complexly, the „good euro‟ strategy would clash with the 
putative role of the euro as world money. If fiscal discipline was relaxed 
among member states, there would be a risk that the value of the euro 
would collapse in international markets. Were that to happen, at the very 
least, the international operations of European banks would become 
extremely difficult. The international role of the euro, which has been 
vital to the project from the beginning, would come under heavy 
pressure. Thus, it is not clear that the „good euro‟ strategy is compatible 
with monetary union. In this light, a „good euro‟ might end up as „no 
euro‟. Those who advocate this strategy ought to be aware of its likely 
implications, i.e., leading to the end of monetary union. Institutional, 
political and social demands have to be tailored accordingly.  
The third alternative is to exit from the eurozone. Even here, 
however, there are choices. There is „conservative exit‟, which is 
increasingly discussed in the Anglo-Saxon press, and would aim at 
devaluation. Some of the pressure of adjustment would be passed onto 
the international sphere, and exports would revive. But there would also 
be losses for those servicing debt abroad, including banks. Workers 
would face wage declines as the price of tradeable goods would rise. 
Devaluation would probably be accompanied by austerity and 
liberalisation, compounding the pressure on workers.  
Long-term improvements in productivity would, however, occur 
only if market forces began spontaneously to develop new capacity in the 
tradeable goods sector. This is extremely difficult for peripheral 
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eurozone countries, with middling technology and middling real wages. 
It is notable that the ruling elites of peripheral countries are aware of 
these difficulties, as well as of their own lack of capacity to deal with 
them. They have implicitly admitted that they possess neither the means 
nor the will to pursue an independent path. Consequently, conservative 
exit might lead to stagnation with repeated devaluations and decline in 
incomes. 
There is, finally, „progressive exit‟ from the eurozone, which 
would require a shift of economic and social power toward labour in 
peripheral countries. There would be devaluation accompanied by 
cessation of payments and restructuring of debt. To prevent collapse of 
the financial system there would have to be widespread nationalisation of 
banking, creating a system of public banks. Controls would also have to 
be imposed on the capital account to prevent outflows of capital. To 
protect output and employment, finally, it would then be necessary to 
expand public ownership over key areas of the economy, including 
public utilities, transport and energy.  
On this basis, it would be possible to develop industrial policy 
that could combine public resources with public credit. There are broad 
areas of the national economy in peripheral countries that call for public 
investment, including infrastructure. Opportunities exist to develop new 
fields of activity in the „green‟ economy. Investment growth would 
provide a basis on which to improve productivity, ever the Achilles heel 
of peripheral economies. Financialisation could then begin to be reversed 
by lessening the relative weight of finance. 
A radical policy shift of this type would require transforming the 
state by establishing mechanisms of transparency and accountability. The 
tax and transfer payments of the state would then take a different shape. 
The tax base would be broadened by limiting tax evasion by the rich as 
well as by capital. Public provision for health and education would be 
gradually improved, as would redistribution policies to alleviate high 
inequality in peripheral countries. 
A policy of progressive exit for peripheral countries would come 
with evident costs and risks. The broad political alliances necessary to 
support such a shift do not exist at present. This absence, incidentally, is 
not necessarily due to lack of popular support for radical change. More 
important is that no credible political force in Europe has had the 
boldness to oppose austerity hitherto. Beyond political difficulties, a 
major problem for progressive exit would be to avoid turning into 
national autarky. Peripheral countries are often small and need to 
maintain access to international trade and investment, particularly within 
Europe. They also need technology transfer.  
International alliances and support would be necessary in order 
to sustain flows of trade, skills and investment. These would be far from 
easy to secure if the rest of the EU remained under the spell of monetary 
union. But note that progressive exit by the periphery would also offer 
fresh prospects to core eurozone countries, particularly to labour which 
has suffered throughout this period. If the eurozone unravelled generally, 
Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour 
1. Several dimensions of a public debt crisis: The report condensed 
12 
 
economic relations between core and periphery could be put on a more 
cooperative basis. 
1.6 The structure of the report  
 
The report focuses on the peripheral countries of the eurozone, above 
all, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. When appropriate, Italian data 
and performance have also been considered, though Italy is by no means 
a peripheral country to the EU. The core of the eurozone is taken to 
comprise Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 3 
Comparisons are usually made with Germany, the leading country of the 
core and the EU as a whole. The introduction of the euro in 1999 – and 
2001 for Greece – provides a natural point of reference for all 
comparisons. Each country has its own distinctive institutional, social 
and historical trajectory, and therefore some pretty brutal generalisations 
are deployed below. But there are also evident commonalities which 
derive in large part from worldwide patterns of economic development 
in recent years, as well as from the nature of the EU and the eurozone. 
 Thus, section 2 of the report discusses macroeconomic 
performance of peripheral countries compared to Germany. Section 3 
moves to labour markets, the remuneration of labour and the patterns of 
productivity growth. Section 4 then turns to international transactions 
particularly within the eurozone. On this basis, section 5 considers the 
evolution of public finance and the expansion of public indebtedness 
after 2007. Section 6 places the growth of public debt in the context of 
the operations and performance of the financial sector following the 
crisis of 2007-9. Section 7 concludes by considering the alternatives 
available to peripheral countries.  
                                                          
3
 Needless to say the EU also has a Central and Eastern European periphery, including the 
Czech Republic, Poland, the Baltic countries, Hungary, and so on. This is an important part of 
the EU economy, particularly as production is increasingly relocated from the core, above all, 
Germany. But these countries are not members of the eurozone, and hence they have been 
left out of the analysis. Still, the crisis of 2007-9 hit the central and eastern periphery first, 
forcing several countries to adopt IMF programmes that enforced severe austerity. The 
trigger was rising indebtedness associated with free capital flows. In this respect, there are 
similarities with the public debt crises in the periphery of the eurozone.  
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2. Macroeconomic performance: Stagnation in Germany, 
bubbles in the periphery 
2.1 Growth, unemployment and inflation 
 
Growth rates among the countries in the sample were generally lower in 
the 2000s than in the 1990s (fig. 1). This fits the pattern of steadily 
declining growth rates across developed countries since the late 1970s. 
But there is also significant variation. Thus, Ireland registered very high 
rates of growth in the 1990s, driven by investment by US multinational 
corporations that were given tax breaks. Profit repatriation has been 
substantial, creating a large disparity between Irish GDP and GNP. 
Much of Irish growth has been due to transfer pricing within 
multinationals, thus also inflating productivity growth. Greek growth 
also accelerated in the early 2000s, bolstered by expenditure for the 
Olympic Games. Spanish growth, finally, has been reasonably high 
throughout the period. 
 
Fig. 1 GDP Growth Rates 
Source: Eurostat 
 
However German growth rates have remained anaemic throughout, with 
the exception of a minor burst in the second half of the 2000s. Exports 
have played a significant role in causing this uptick of growth, a 
development of the first importance for the evolution of the eurozone. 
Portuguese and Italian growth has barely diverged from German rates 
since the introduction of the euro. 
 Unemployment rates are consistent with growth rates (fig. 2), 
showing convergence toward lower levels in the 2000s compared to the 
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1990s. This is mostly because Spanish and Irish unemployment rates 
declined rapidly at the end of the 1990s. Spanish unemployment, 
however, remained on the high end of the spectrum throughout, and has 
risen faster than the rest once the crisis of 2007-9 materialised. 
Unemployment seems to expand rapidly in Spain at the first sign of 
economic difficulty. The Greek labour market is probably not very 
different, bearing in mind that official statistics tend to underestimate 
unemployment. Greek unemployment rose rapidly in 2009, once the 
crisis hit hard. Equally striking, however, have been the high rates of 
German unemployment throughout this period, if anything exhibiting an 
upward trend. The same holds for Portugal, which has followed 
Germany in this respect too. 
 
Fig.2 Unemployment Rates 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Inflation rates, on the other hand, present a more complex pattern (fig. 
3). Rates converged to a fairly narrow range of 2-4% in 2001, at the time 
of the introduction of the euro. However, in the following three years 
rates diverged, only to converge again in 2004, this time to a narrower 
range of 2-3%. Inflation targeting by the ECB and the application of a 
common monetary policy took some time to produce the desired effect. 
The picture is at most a qualified success for the ECB as inflation rates 
accelerated again in 2007-8. The most important element of figure 3, 
however, is that German inflation rates have remained consistently 
below the rest throughout the period, rarely exceeding 2%.  
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Fig. 3 Inflation Rates  
(Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices)
Source: Eurostat 
 
In short, the German economy has produced a characteristic and 
consistent macroeconomic performance throughout the period, marked 
by mediocre growth, high unemployment and low inflation. German 
performance has set the tone for the eurozone and placed its stamp on 
the operation of the euro. The sovereign debt crisis has its roots as much 
in the performance of Germany, as it does in the actions of peripheral 
countries.  
 
2.2. Investment and Consumption  
 
A closer look at the components of aggregate demand gives 
further insight into macroeconomic performance. Before looking at 
investment and consumption, however, note that the economies in the 
sample are generally service-based. The secondary sector contributes 
slightly less than 30% of GDP in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. It 
amounts to roughly 45% of GDP in Ireland, but that is largely due to the 
presence of multinationals. Greece is also an exception, the secondary 
sector standing at about 20% of GDP. Agriculture makes a minor 
contribution to output throughout.  
Investment performance has been poor, with the exception of 
Spain and Ireland (fig. 4), which even underwent investment booms in 
the late 2000s. But Irish investment in the 1990s was in large part due to 
US multinational activities. Generally, investment has been weak:  
Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour 
2. Macroeconomic performance: Stagnation in Germany; bubbles in the periphery 
16 
 
 
Fig. 4 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
% of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
A better picture of underlying trends is given by investment net of 
housing (fig. 5). It is clear that the investment boom in Ireland in the 
2000s was primarily due to a real estate bubble. The Spanish investment 
boom was also heavily based on real estate. Investment in the productive 
sector has been generally weak in the sample 
 
Fig. 5 Gross Fixed Capital Formation Net of Housing 
 % of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
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Consumption, on the other hand, has remained pretty flat relative to 
GDP, with the exception of Portugal where it rose significantly after the 
introduction of the euro (fig. 6). The striking aspect of consumption, 
however, is the exceptionally high level of Greece, rapidly approached by 
Portugal in the second half of the 2000s. High household consumption 
has been the mode of integration for both countries in the eurozone. 
This is a significant difference with Spain and Italy, and has important 
implications for indebtedness, as is shown below. The other exception is 
Ireland, where private consumption has been a very low proportion of 
GDP. 
Fig. 6 Household Consumption 
% of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The patterns of consumption are broadly reflected in saving (fig. 7). For 
both Greece and Portugal saving as a percentage of GDP became 
negative in the second half of the 2000s. Thus, high and rising 
consumption has been supported by rising household debt. However, 
savings have also declined in Spain, Italy, and even in Ireland in the 
2000s. Households across the periphery have found it difficult to sustain 
consumption on current income. The exception is Germany, where 
saving rose in the second half of the 2000s, in line with weak 
consumption. German growth, such it has been in the 2000s, has come 
neither from investment nor from consumption, but from exports. The 
contractionary pressures at the core of the German economy have been 
fundamental to the evolution of the euro, directly contributing to the 
sovereign debt crisis.  
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Fig. 7 Savings 
% of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
2.3 Debt 
 
Household debt has risen consistently across peripheral countries in the 
sample. Financialisation of individual worker incomes has proceeded 
apace among peripheral countries of the eurozone throughout the last 
two decades. Growth of debt has been driven by consumption but also 
by rising prices of real estate. Low interest rates in the 2000s, as the ECB 
applied the same monetary policy across the eurozone, allowed workers 
to increase their indebtedness. In particular, Portugal, Spain and Ireland 
have approached ratios of household debt to GDP of around 100% (fig. 
8). These are very high levels of debt that would be difficult to support if 
unemployment and interest rates rose in the near future.  
The vital exception is, again, Germany, where household 
indebtedness has declined, in line with weak consumption and the 
absence of a housing bubble. While households in peripheral countries 
have been accumulating debt as part of the integration of these countries 
in the eurozone, German households have been reducing the relative 
burden of their debt. This contrast is an integral part of the differential 
response of eurozone countries to the shock of the crisis of 2007-9, 
contributing to the sovereign debt crisis.  
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Fig. 8 Household Liabilities 
% of GDP 
Source: Eurostat, CB and FSA of Ireland 
 
Corporate debt, meanwhile, has not shown a tendency to rise 
significantly across the sample in the years following the introduction of 
the euro, with the exception of Spain and Ireland, the only countries in 
which investment also rose strongly during the period (fig. 9).  
 
Fig. 9 Non-financial Corporation Liabilities 
% of GDP 
Source: Eurostat and CB and FSA of Ireland 
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Recapping, macroeconomic performance of peripheral countries relative 
to Germany has demonstrated considerable variation but also common 
patterns. At the core of the eurozone, Germany has been marked by low 
growth, flat investment, stagnant consumption, rising savings, and falling 
household debt. This is not a dynamic capitalist economy on any score. 
The only source of dynamism has been exports, for reasons that will 
become clear below. 
Confronted with the weak performance of the dominant partner 
of the eurozone, peripheral countries have adopted a variety of 
approaches. Thus, Spain and Ireland have had investment booms that 
were based heavily on real estate speculation and bubbles. Greece and 
Portugal, meanwhile, have relied on high consumption, driven by 
household debt. Indeed, household debt has risen substantially across 
the peripherals. Italy, finally, has been lodged in what could only be 
described as stagnation throughout this period.  
Integration of peripheral countries into the eurozone, in other 
words, has been precarious. This is apparent in their export 
performance, which is the mirror image of German performance, as is 
shown below. It is also apparent in the patterns of household 
financialisation, which have moved in the opposite direction to 
Germany. These structural contrasts lie at the root of the current crisis. 
The evidence also shows that it is fallacious to interpret the crisis as the 
result of inefficient peripheral economies being unable to deal with the 
efficient German economy. It is the size of the German economy and its 
export performance – which has very specific causes attached to the euro 
– that have allowed it to dominate the eurozone. Efficiency has had little 
to do with it. Consider now the labour market in order fully to establish 
this point.  
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3. Labour remuneration and productivity: A general 
squeeze, but more effective in Germany 
3.1 A race to the bottom 
 
The EU has systematically promoted labour market reform aimed at 
reinforcing the process of monetary integration. Starting with the 
Maastricht treaty (1992), social provisions began to be included in 
European treaties apparently to reinforce economic coordination. 
Labour market policies have been considered national initiatives, but the 
Luxemburg European Council (1997) launched the first European 
Employment Strategy, followed by the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The 
Lisbon Strategy stated the need for more flexibility in labour markets. 
The apparent aims were to achieve full-employment, create a knowledge 
intensive labour market, and raise employment rates.  
During the 2000s, the Lisbon agenda was repeatedly reinforced, 
including by “Guidelines for Growth and Jobs", "National Reform 
Programmes" and "Recommendations" from the European Council. 
Particularly after the de Kok report (2004), policy toward labour markets 
has stressed the need for flexibility, contract standardisation, promotion 
of temporary and part-time work, and creation of (tax) incentives to 
encourage labour force participation. 4 It is also true that improving the 
quality of employment was emphasised by the Council meetings of Nice 
(2000) and Barcelona (2002). In practice, however, the pressure of 
reform has led to a race to the bottom for workers‟ pay and conditions. 
Several European legislative initiatives have met with strong resistance in 
recent years, for instance, reform of the internal market in services 
(Bolkenstein directive), or the new Working Time directive that would 
potentially increase the working week to sixty-five hours. Partly as a 
response, the European Commission has recently promoted a general 
agenda of reform focused on the Danish model of “flexicurity” – weak 
legal protection of labour relations compensated by strong state support 
for the unemployed.  
Given that a single monetary policy has applied across the 
eurozone, and given also the tough constraints on fiscal policy (through 
the Stability Pact), labour market policy has been one of the few levers 
available to different countries to improve external competitiveness. 
Therefore, the effects of labour market policies have varied profoundly 
among different eurozone countries. Core countries are characterised by 
high real wages and strong social policies, while peripheral countries 
typically have low real wages and weak welfare states. Political and trade 
union organisation also differ substantially among eurozone countries. 
All eurozone countries have joined the race of imposing labour market 
flexibility and compressing labour costs, but from very different starting 
points. 
                                                          
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf  
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Of fundamental importance in this connection has been labour 
market policy in Germany. Put in a nutshell, Germany has been more 
successful than peripheral countries at squeezing workers‟ pay and 
conditions. The German economy might have performed poorly, but 
Germany has led the way in imposing flexibility and restraining real 
wages. Characteristic of the trend have been labour market reforms of 
2003 introduced by the Social Democratic Party and known as Agenda 
2010. New labour contracts have reduced social contributions and 
unemployment benefits. Since the early 1990s, furthermore, it has been 
possible for German capital to take full advantage of cheaper labour in 
Eastern Europe. The combined effect of these factors has been to put 
downward pressure on German wages, thus improving the 
competitiveness of the German economy. 5 
Peripheral countries with weak welfare states, lower real wages, 
and well-organised labour movements, such as Greece, Portugal, Italy 
and Spain, have been unable to squeeze workers equally hard. Ireland, on 
the other hand, has been at the forefront of imposing more liberal 
conditions on its workers. Unfortunately for the Irish elite, this did not 
spare the country from the severe impact of the crisis of 2007-9.  
3.2. The determinants of German competitive success 
 
The difference in outlook between Germany and the peripheral 
countries can be demonstrated by considering the behaviour of nominal 
labour unit costs, that is, nominal labour remuneration divided by real 
output. Nominal unit costs can be disaggregated into nominal cost per 
hour of labour divided by labour productivity. This is a standard measure 
used to compare competitiveness internationally. 6 The trajectory of 
nominal unit costs, therefore, gives insight into the variation of nominal 
cost of labour relative to labour productivity. This trajectory is shown in 
figure 10 across the sample during this period, with 1995 as base year. 
Note that data on productivity is notoriously unreliable, thus the 
evidence should be used with considerable caution. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Germany has a long history of competitive real devaluation of the Deutschmark, to which 
labour unions were often complicit. Nonetheless, union power has been significantly 
reduced under the social-democratic government of Schroeder. Equally, German unification 
has had a major impact on German labour relations, weakening collective bargaining and 
creating large union-free zones in the east that are slowly spreading to parts of the west.   
6
 Take W to be the nominal remuneration of labour, which is more than wages and includes 
other labour costs for employers. Take Y to be nominal output and P the price level. The 
nominal unit cost of labour would then be W/(Y/P), a standard measure of international 
competitiveness. This could obviously be disaggregated into (W/L)/(Y/PL). It would then 
show nominal remuneration per hour of labour divided by labour productivity, which is the 
variable traced in figure 10, allowing for comparisons in underlying trends. Note that real 
remuneration of labour is simply W/P, the variable captured in figure 11. If rendered per unit 
of real output, i.e., as (W/P)/(Y/P), it would show the share of labour in real output, traced in 
figure 13. 
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Fig. 10 Nominal Unit Labour Costs  
(1995 = 100) Source: AMECO 
 
 
The most striking aspect of this data is the flatness of nominal unit 
labour costs in Germany. It appears that the opening of Eastern Europe 
to German capital together with sustained pressure on pay and 
conditions has forced nominal labour costs to move at an almost 
identical pace to productivity. However, in peripheral countries things 
have been different. Unit labour costs have increased significantly as 
nominal labour costs have risen faster than productivity, with Greece in 
the lead. In short, peripheral countries have been losing competitiveness 
relative to Germany in the internal eurozone market.  
The more rapid rise in nominal labour costs was accompanied by 
generally higher inflation in the periphery compared to Germany, as was 
previously shown in relation to figure 3. Nevertheless, nominal labour 
costs rose generally faster than inflation, thus leading to increasing real 
compensation of labour in the periphery, as is shown in figure 11 
(definition in footnote 6). Extra care is required here as real 
compensation is not the same thing as real wages, and moreover it hides 
a broad range of payments to managers and others in the form of wages 
and bonuses. Furthermore, the aggregate conceals considerable 
inequality in real wages among different groups of workers. Still, figure 
11 shows that the real compensation of labour has risen faster in 
peripheral countries compared to Germany, with the exception of Spain.  
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Fig. 11 Real Compensation of Labour  
(1995 = 100) Source: AMECO 
 
 
3.3. Real compensation and the share of labour in output 
 
It is no wonder, therefore, that conservative commentators in the 
press have remarked that the sovereign debt crisis ultimately derives 
from peripheral country workers receiving higher increases in 
compensation than German workers, leading to a loss of 
competitiveness. 7 This is true, but also misleading. For, the real problem 
has not been excessive compensation for peripheral workers but 
negligible increases for German workers, particularly after the 
introduction of the euro. Even in Greece, in which nominal and real 
compensation have increased the most, the rise in real compensation has 
been of the order of 20% during the period of 2000-8, and that from a 
low base compared to Germany.  
The modesty of labour remuneration in the periphery becomes 
clear when put in the context of productivity growth:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 See, for example: Roubini, N. and E. Parisi-Capone, “An IMF rescue for Greece?”, 
Forbes.com, 18 Feb 2010. http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/17/greek-financial-crisis-imf-
ecb-opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini-elisa-parisi-capone.html.  Also: Roubini, N. 
“Teaching PIIGS to fly”, Project Syndicate, 15 Feb 2010. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/roubini22/English  
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Fig. 12 Labour Productivity 
(1995 = 100) Source: OECD 
 
 
There has been weaker productivity growth in Germany compared to the 
rest during this period, with the exception of Spain which has been 
extremely weak. This is more evidence of the lack of dynamism of the 
German economy: Irish, Greek and Portuguese productivity rose faster, 
even if from a lower base (Irish productivity is probably exaggerated for 
reasons to do with multinational transfer pricing). Peripheral countries 
have generally improved productivity, and certainly done better than 
Germany, which has been a laggard. But the Lisbon Strategy has not 
succeeded in putting peripheral countries on a strongly rising path of 
productivity. There has been no true catching up with the more 
advanced economies of the eurozone, with the partial exception of 
Ireland. Productivity increases have been respectable compared to 
Germany, but that is because Germany has performed badly.  
Nonetheless, productivity growth has still been faster than the 
rise in real remuneration of labour. Consequently, labour has lost share 
in output more or less across the sample, as is shown in figure 13 
(definition in footnote 6). The only sustained increase after the 
introduction of the euro was in Ireland, where workers barely made good 
the losses sustained in the 1990s. Workers have generally lost relative to 
capital across the sample, German workers faring poorly compared to 
the others.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour 
3. Labour remuneration and productivity 
26 
 
Fig. 13 Labour share in GDP 
(1995 = 100) Source: AMECO 
 
 
To sum up, labour market policies at national and EU level have applied 
sustained pressure on workers across the eurozone. This pressure has 
played an important role in determining competitiveness, given the 
rigidity of monetary and fiscal policies. The result has been loss of 
output share by workers across the eurozone. In peripheral countries real 
compensation has increased in some countries, though productivity has 
increased even faster. Nonetheless, productivity did not rise fast enough 
to ensure catching up with the more advanced economies of the core.  
In Germany, on the other hand, productivity, real compensation, 
and nominal unit labour costs have increased very slowly. It cannot be 
overstressed that gains in German competitiveness have nothing to do 
with investment, technology, and efficiency. The competitive advantage 
of German exporters has derived from the high exchange rates at which 
peripheral countries entered the eurozone and, more significantly, from 
the harsh squeeze on German workers. Hence Germany has been able to 
dominate trade and capital flows within the eurozone. This has 
contributed directly to the current crisis.  
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4. International transactions: Trade and capital flows in 
the shadow of Germany 
4.1 Current account: surplus for Germany, deficits for periphery 
The international transactions of eurozone countries have been shaped 
in large measure by the policies adopted to support the euro. The euro 
has been devised as a common measure of value and means of payment 
within the eurozone. The intention was that it should also become 
means of payment and reserve outside the eurozone, thus competing 
directly with the US dollar in the world market. Monetary and fiscal 
policies of eurozone countries have had to be consistent with this aim, 
thus imposing a common monetary policy and tight constraints on fiscal 
policy for each state. The institutional and policy framework of the 
eurozone have not arisen merely due to ideological dominance of neo-
liberal thinking within the EU. They have also been dictated by the need 
to sustain the euro in its role within and outside the eurozone. 
The pattern of international transactions that has emerged for 
eurozone countries is consistent with the putative role of the euro. In the 
first instance, peripheral countries were obliged to join the euro at 
generally high exchange rates. Core countries, above all Germany, 
insisted upon this policy with the ostensible purpose of ensuring low 
inflation. High inflation in individual countries would have undermined 
the ability of the euro to compete internationally against the dollar. The 
implication was to reduce at a stroke the competitiveness of peripheral 
countries in the internal market. To this poor start was added sustained 
loss of competitiveness, discussed in the previous section. The result, 
shown in figure 14, was inevitable: emergence of entrenched current 
account deficits for peripheral countries, matched by an equally 
entrenched current account surplus for Germany.  
Fig. 14 Current account  balance 
% GDP  Source: IMF BOP 
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Care is obviously necessary in interpreting this picture. Greece, Portugal 
and Spain have run substantial balance of trade deficits, but they have 
also had significant surpluses on services. Ireland has followed the 
opposite path, again reflecting its own mode of integration into the 
eurozone based on high investment, much of it directed to housing, and 
intensified labour flexibility. For all, inability to restrain nominal labour 
unit costs at German levels and, more fundamentally, inability to set 
productivity growth on a strongly rising path, resulted in current account 
deficits mirrored by surpluses for Germany. Note that two thirds of 
German trade is with the eurozone. Note also that the eurozone trade 
with the rest of the world is roughly in balance. 
The euro and its attendant policy framework have become 
mechanisms ensuring German current account surpluses that derive 
mostly from the eurozone. Peripheral countries joined a monetary 
system that purported to create a world money, thus signing away some 
of their competitiveness, while adopting policies that exacerbated the 
competitiveness gap. The beneficiary of this process has been Germany, 
because it has a larger economy with higher levels of productivity, and 
because it has been able to squeeze its own workers harder than others. 
Structural current account surpluses have been the only source of growth 
for the German economy during the last two decades. The euro is a 
„beggar-thy-neighbour‟ policy for Germany, on condition that it beggars 
its own workers first.  
4.2 Financial account: German FDI and bank lending to the 
periphery 
Inevitably, the picture appears in reverse on the capital and financial 
account (fig. 15). Germany has exported capital on a large scale, while 
peripheral countries have been importing capital.  
Fig. 15 Capital and financial account 
Net, $bn. Source: IMF BOP 
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The financial account comprises fundamentally foreign direct investment 
(FDI), portfolio flows, and „other‟ flows that are heavily driven by banks. 
The direction of aggregate flows between Germany and the periphery of 
the eurozone can be simply gauged from the composition of the German 
financial account (fig. 16): 
Fig. 16 Composition of German financial account 
Euro, bn. Source: Bundesbank 
 
 
The driving forces behind sustained capital exports by Germany since 
the introduction of the euro have been „other‟ and FDI flows. Portfolio 
flows have been weaker, even turning inward for much of the 2000s. Put 
summarily, Germany has been recycling its current account surpluses as 
FDI and bank lending abroad. Bank lending peaked in 2007-8 and, as is 
shown below, this has been a vital element of the current sovereign debt 
crisis. 
The geographical direction of the recycling of surpluses is clear 
once again from the composition of German capital exports.  The 
eurozone has been the main recipient of German FDI (fig. 17), while 
also competing with the non-euro part of the EU for German bank 
lending in the 2000s (fig. 18). Once the crisis of 2007-9 broke out, 
German banks restricted their lending to non-euro EU countries but 
continued to lend significantly to eurozone countries.  
To recap, international transactions of eurozone countries have 
been driven by the requirements and implications of monetary union. 
Peripheral countries have lost competitiveness relative to Germany 
because of initially high exchange rates as well as because of the ability of 
German employers to squeeze workers harder. The result has been a 
structural current account surplus for Germany, mirrored by structural 
current account deficits for peripheral countries. Consequently, German 
FDI and bank lending to the eurozone have increased significantly. 
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„Other‟ flows to peripheral countries rose rapidly in 2007-8 as the crisis 
unfolded, but then declined equally rapidly. That was the time when 
peripheral states were forced to appear in credit markets seeking funds. 
 
Fig 17 German outward FDI by region 
 Euro, bn. Source: Bundesbank 
 
 
Fig 18 German ‘other’ outward flows by region 
Euro, bn. Source: Bundesbank 
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5. Rising public sector borrowing: Dealing with failed 
banks and worsening recession  
5.1. The straightjacket on fiscal policy 
 
The public sector of peripheral countries, and above all Greece, has been 
at the epicentre of the current turmoil. The reasons for this, however, are 
only partially related to the intrinsic weaknesses of the public sector in 
peripheral countries. The current crisis is due to the nature of monetary 
union, the mode of integration of peripheral countries in the eurozone, 
and the impact of the crisis of 2007-9. Public sector debt has become a 
focus for the tensions that have emanated from these sources for 
reasons discussed below. 
 It is apparent that the sovereign debt crisis has not been chiefly 
caused by state incompetence, inefficiency and the like. Eurozone states 
have been operating within the framework of the Growth and Stability 
Pact, the main components of which emerged already in the early 1990s 
with the Maastricht Treaty. The underlying logic has been that, if the 
euro was going to become a world reserve currency and means of 
payment, there had to be coherence of fiscal policy to match the single 
monetary policy. Rising public deficits and accumulating state debt 
would have reduced the international value of the euro. The Stability 
Pact is important to making the euro a competitor to the dollar.  
 In this respect, the EU has faced an inherent contradiction 
because it is an alliance of sovereign states. Sovereignty means little 
without power and ability to tax, always reflecting the social composition 
of particular countries. Therefore, a compromise was reached, in large 
measure imposed by the core countries. The Stability Pact has imposed 
the arbitrary limit of 60% national debt relative to GDP and an almost as 
arbitrary limit of 3% for budget deficits that would hopefully prevent the 
level of public debt from rising. Fiscal policy was placed in a 
straightjacket that has tormented eurozone states for nearly two decades.  
 The Stability Pact represents a loss of sovereignty for eurozone 
states. However, not all states within the eurozone were created equal. 
The loss of sovereignty has been more severe for peripheral states, as has 
been repeatedly demonstrated when France or Italy have exceeded the 
limits on deficits and debt. It is no surprise that peripheral states have 
resorted to the weapons of the weak, that is, subterfuge and guile. Some 
of the techniques used to hide public debt have been ruinous to public 
accounts in the long run. The Greeks have led the way with persistent 
manipulation of national statistics throughout the 2000s as well as barely 
legal deals with Goldman Sachs that presented public borrowing as a 
derivative transaction. Public-private transactions have also been widely 
deployed in the periphery to postpone expenditure into the future, 
typically at a loss to the public. 
But fiscal policy has continued to be the province of each 
individual state, and has remained fragmented compared to unified 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the Stability Pact has made no provision 
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for fiscal transfers across the eurozone, as would have happened within a 
unitary state. There are no centralised fiscal means of relieving the 
pressures of differential competitiveness and variable integration into the 
eurozone. The European budget is currently very small, at just over 1% 
of the aggregate GDP of all EU states, which is a small fraction of the 
German, French, and UK budgets. Moreover, it is not allowed to go into 
deficit. 
This structural weakness of the eurozone has been much 
discussed in recent years, including in the course of the current crisis. 8  
What is less discussed, however, is that it also has implications for the 
ECB. A key function of a central bank is to manage the debt of its state, 
handling the state‟s access to financial markets and ensuring the smooth 
absorption of fresh issues. A central bank is also able to acquire state 
debt directly, facilitating the financing of fiscal deficits for longer or 
shorter periods of time. But the ECB has no obligation to manage the 
debt of member states, and is expressly forbidden to buy state debt. On 
both scores, the ECB does not behave as a normal central bank. The 
inherent weakness of the ECB is part of the dysfunctional co-ordination 
of monetary and fiscal policy within the eurozone, which has been made 
evident in the course of the sovereign debt crisis. 
5.2 Rising public deficits and debt due to the crisis 
 
Turning to the actual path of public finances, it is important to note that 
public finance reflects the historical, institutional, and social 
development of each country. There can be no generalisation in this 
regard as welfare systems are variable, tax regimes reflect past 
compromises, the ability to collect tax depends on the efficiency of the 
state machine, and so on. Nonetheless, the Stability Pact has imposed 
certain common trends upon eurozone states.  
Public expenditure declined steadily in the 1990s, with the 
exception of Greece, where it remained fairly flat (fig. 19). In the 2000s 
expenditure stayed more or less flat across the sample, except for 
Germany, where it continued to fall steadily, and Portugal, where it rose 
gently. Once again, Germany has had considerable success in imposing 
fiscal austerity on itself, but also across the sample. Public expenditure 
turned upward after 2007 as the crisis hit and states attempted to rescue 
financial systems while also supporting aggregate demand. Once again, 
Germany is the exception as expenditure did not pick up.  
                                                          
8
 See Thomas Palley in FT, 10
th 
Feb 2010 
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2010/02/euroland-is-being-crucified-upon-its-cross-
of-gold/#more-8751.  On the structural weaknesses of the eurozone see Arestis, P. and M. 
Sawyer. 2006. Macroeconomic Policy and the European Constitution, in Alternative 
Perspectives on Economic Policies in the European Union, P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds.), 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-33. On the specific  response of the EU to the crisis, see 
EuroMemorandum Group. 2009. Europe in Crisis: A Critique of the EU’S Failure to Respond, 
available at  http://criticalpoliticaleconomy.blogspot.com/2009/11/euromemorandum-
20092010.html  
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Fig. 19 Government expenditure 
% GDP Source: Eurostat 
 
Fig. 20  Government revenue 
% GDP Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Public revenue showed equal complexity, reflecting the particular 
conditions of each country (fig. 20). Greek public revenue slumped in 
the middle of the 2000s as taxation was lowered on the rich, while the 
tax-collecting mechanism was disrupted. It rose toward the end of the 
decade, but not enough to make good the decline. Irish public revenue 
was the weakest, though an attempt was made to shore things up in the 
second half of the 2000s. Spain and Portugal maintained reasonable 
revenue collection throughout. Public revenue declined across the 
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sample once the crisis of 2007-9 began to bite. Recessions and falling 
aggregate demand were at the heart of the fall. 
Falling revenue and rising expenditure cased by the crisis 
inevitably led to strong increases in public deficits. Consequently, in 
2009, several peripheral and other eurozone states arrived in the financial 
markets seeking to borrow large volumes of funds. The pressure appears 
to have been particularly strong for Greece, Spain and Ireland, less so for 
Portugal: 
Fig. 21  Government primary balance 
% GDP Source: Eurostat 
 
Fig. 22  General Government Gross Debt 
% of GDP  Source: Eurostat 
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Inevitably, national debt also began to rise relative to GDP after 2007 
(See Fig. 22). 
Note that there are significant differences in the volumes of 
eurozone public debt, again reflecting each country‟s respective 
economic and social trajectory. But Greek debt, about which so much 
has been written recently, is not the highest in the group, and nor has it 
been rising in the 2000s. On the contrary, Greek national debt declined 
gently as a proportion of GDP in the second half of the 2000s. Only in 
Germany and Portugal did national debt rise throughout this period, 
though gently and from a fairly low base. The sudden rise of public debt 
across the eurozone in the last couple of years has been purely the result 
of the crisis of 2007-9. 
Public sector performance in the eurozone can be easily summed 
up. The Stability Pact has imposed a straightjacket on member states, but 
its effect has been conditioned by residual sovereignty in each state. The 
fragmentation of fiscal policy has contrasted sharply with the unification 
of monetary policy. Nevertheless, eurozone states have generally 
restrained public expenditure, while maintaining a variable outlook on 
revenue collection. The decisive moment arrived with the crisis of 2007-
9, which pushed peripheral states toward deficits. At that point the 
underlying weaknesses of integration in the eurozone emerged for each 
peripheral state, including current account deficits and rising capital 
imports from the core.  
There are no structural reasons why these tensions should have 
concentrated so heavily on Greece. No doubt the country has a relatively 
large public debt and therefore faces a heavy need for refinancing, 
particularly as the budget swung violently into deficit in 2009. But Italian 
public debt is also high. It is also true that the Greeks have been 
persistently manipulating data and they face a large current account 
deficit. But these pressures could have been handled reasonably 
smoothly if it was not for speculation in the financial markets. Even 
speculation could have been confronted decisively, if the eurozone 
authorities had shown any inclination. To analyse the interplay of these 
factors it is now necessary to consider the financial sector, the part of the 
economy that is most heavily responsible for the crisis of 2007-9. 
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6. The financial sector: How to create a global crisis and 
then benefit from it 
6.1 An institutional framework that favours financial but also 
productive capital  
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks 
constitute the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which has 
price stability as its primary objective. The ECB has normative power 
over the national central banks since decision making on monetary (and 
financial) policy emanates from the ECB and then reaches national 
central banks. It can also make recommendations to national authorities 
relating to prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of 
the financial system.  
The ECB is an unusual central bank. It has the exclusive right to 
authorise the issuing of banknotes in the EU, though notes are printed 
by individual central banks. It is also responsible for holding and 
managing official foreign reserves of member states. However, the ECB 
(and national central banks) is prohibited from offering overdrafts or 
other credit facilities to member states, including the purchase of public 
debt instruments. The ECB is considered independent in the sense that 
no public institution or individual member state is authorised to 
influence its operations and decisions. But its substantial independence 
comes from the absence of a unitary European state with which it would 
have been obliged to interact.  
The peculiar character of the ECB is also apparent in its own 
statutes. Subscription to ECB capital and the transfer of foreign reserve 
assets to the ECB, for instance, are proportionate to each member state‟s 
population and GDP. Furthermore, when the number of member states 
exceeds fifteen, participation in the decision-making process of the ECB 
is supposed to take place on the basis of GDP as well as on the 
aggregate balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions of each 
member state, again reflecting a hierarchy of state power . 9   
The ECB has supported financialisation in Europe mostly by 
protecting the interests of financial capital. European financial markets 
have been unified as financial liberalisation has spread and become 
deeper. Restrictions on financial operations have been abolished among 
the member states. Monetary union and establishing the euro as world 
money have benefited European financial capital in competition with US 
and other global banks. The euro has also been marked by an 
appreciation bias, rising from around 0.95 to the dollar at its launch to 
reach a peak of 1.58 in July 2008. The euro has retreated since then, 
particularly following the sovereign debt crisis, and currently stands at 
around 1.35 to the dollar. Without necessarily being deliberate, the 
                                                          
9
 According to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, C115.  
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appreciation bias has served the interests of financial capital since it has 
helped to induce global wealth holders to change the currency 
composition of their portfolios in favour of the euro.  
The appreciation bias of the euro also appears not to have hurt 
the interests of the European productive sector, because it has forced 
productive capital to lower costs in order to be able to compete globally. 
This has meant steady pressure on workers‟ pay and conditions. German 
structural adjustment in the 2000s, in particular, has been based on 
squeezing workers, as was shown in section 3. Productive capital has also 
benefited from reductions in uncertainty surrounding exchange rates as 
well as from differences in financial environment. Finally, a strong and 
rising euro has also supported European capital in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) in other parts of the world. In short, the euro as 
world money has been in the international interests of both financial and 
productive capital in Europe.  
For European banks in particular, the euro has provided liquidity 
facilities regulated by the ECB that have been able to support banking 
expansion across the world. The European banking system (mainly 
German and Dutch banks) steadily increased its net long US-dollar 
positions until the middle of 2007 (roughly $400 bn), with the ECB 
effectively acting as one of the main funding counterparties. 10 Note also 
that, in contrast to other central banks of mature countries, the ECB has 
always accepted private securities as collateral in its operations. Normal 
procedure for central banks is to accept only government securities. The 
Federal Reserve, for instance, started to accept private securities in 2008 
only as an extraordinary response to the crisis.   
There is no doubt that the institutional arrangements of the euro 
have been beneficial to European finance. However, after the outbreak 
of the global crisis and as global banks faced trouble, the significance of 
the absence of coordination between the monetary and the fiscal spheres 
became apparent. In contrast to the USA and the UK, monetary union 
has revealed an underlying weakness, namely the absence of a unitary 
state in Europe.  
Given the absence of political union, the Stability Pact has acted 
as anchor for the euro in the world market. Contrary to the USA, which 
has been able to relax fiscal policy, the euro has required fiscal tightening 
as the crisis unfolded. The implication has been to push states toward 
policies that further squeeze workers in peripheral countries, while 
defending the interests of the European financial system. Thus, 
monetary union has meant an asymmetric adjustment between banks and 
states in the financial sphere after the crisis: banks have been protected, 
while the onus of adjustment has fallen on weaker peripheral states.  
                                                          
10
 Bank of International Settlement. 2009. The US dollar shortage in global banking and the 
international policy response, Working Paper 291. 
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6.2 Banking in the eurozone: The core becomes exposed to the 
periphery  
 
Financialisation has developed in both core and peripheral countries of 
the eurozone, as is clear from the rising volume of financial institution 
assets relative to GDP:   
 
Table 1: Credit institutions, Total Assets/GDP  
Source:  ECB (2010): Structural indicators for the European Union banking sector, and ECB (2005): 
European Union banking structures 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008   
107% 123% 142% 156% 155% 142% 124% 124% 142% 147% 167% 190% Greece 
262% 304% 240% 404% 461% 364% 413% 487% 583% 674% 715% 760% Ireland 
156% 143% 147% 152% 152% 161% 159% 164% 176% 189% 217% 231% Italy 
237% 286% 281% 274% 287% 263% 252% 240% 242% 255% 270% 290% Portugal 
170% 173% 178% 185% 193% 184% 192% 204% 237% 256% 281% 309% Spain 
227% 239% 247% 258% 272% 251% 263% 273% 295% 307% 329% 379% Austria 
306% 298% 304% 282% 303% 297% 302% 316% 349% 354% 392% 370% Belgium 
244% 239% 251% 247% 257% 247% 251% 266% 294% 317% 353% 371% France 
256% 275% 287% 299% 304% 297% 295% 298% 304% 307% 312% 316% Germany 
231% 255% 263% 286% 298% 292% 309% 342% 333% 351% 392% 376% Netherlands 
 
 
It is not apparent that there are systematic differences between core and 
peripheral countries with respect to financialisation. There is, however, 
considerable variety among them. Furthermore, there has been no 
dramatic increase in foreign banking ownership, unlike trends in several 
developing economies during the same period. Assets of foreign banks 
(both subsidiaries and branches) in the eurozone stand around 20-25% 
of total assets of credit institutions, the only exception being Ireland, 
with around 50%. 11  
The international investment position of European banks, 
however, presents several noteworthy features. Figure 23 shows that the 
aggregate cross-border claims of banks have been rising globally since 
the mid-1980s, and quite rapidly in the 2000s. 12 But the aggregate of 
cross-border claims of European banks rose much faster in the 2000s. 
The data is presented in US dollars, and the appreciating euro to US 
                                                          
11
 See tables 8,15,18,21 and 24 in ECB: Structural analysis of the EU banking sector, 
16/11/2002; tables 2,11 and 13 in ECB: EU banking structures, 07/10/2005; tables 2,11 and 
13 in ECB: Structural indicators for the EU banking sector, 15/01/2010. 
12
 Source is the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Table 8 
(http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm). “Aggregate of Major European Nations” is 
calculated as the sum of the International Position of reporting banks from Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, 
Jersey, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Europe. 
“Aggregate of other nations” is calculated as the reported item ‘All Countries’ minus the 
“Aggregate of Major European Nations”. 
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dollar exchange rate is shown on the right hand scale. To a certain 
extent, the appreciating euro would have inflated balance sheets 
denominated in euros compared to those denominated in dollars. 
Nevertheless the growth in the international claims of European banks 
appears also to reflect greater integration within the European Union, 
drawing on the beneficial effect of the single currency and single market 
for finance.  
Fig.23 International positions by nationality of ownership of 
reporting banks 
USD, bn. Source: BIS, Locational Banking Statistics 
 
 
Turning to cross-border lending within the eurozone, it is useful to 
consider those in terms of core (Germany, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands) and periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
Lending has increased in both directions. As is shown in figure 24, gross 
exposure by banks grew from March 2005 until early 2008, after which it 
declined across the board as banks reined in their lending. It is important 
to highlight, however, that even though there has been growth across the 
sample, flows from core to periphery have become more important in 
size than flows from core to core.  
Furthermore, as figure 25 shows, net banking flows from core to 
the periphery have been positive and increasing in the second half of the 
2000s (starting March 2005, notwithstanding a statistical adjustment in 
March 2007) 13 peaking in September 2008. As gross flows in figure 24 
indicate, this change has been driven mainly by lending from core to 
periphery, which rose throughout this period. It is also notable that 
                                                          
13
 'Italian banks’ foreign claims rose by $649 billion in March 2007, nearly twice the increase 
in the previous quarter, due to a change in reporting that led to a reclassification of a 
number of subsidiaries, particularly those located in Germany.’ BIS Quarterly Review, Sep. 
2007, p.21. 
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claims by the periphery to core began to fall earlier than those from core 
to periphery. 
Fig.24 Gross cross-border bank claims 
Euro, bn Source: BIS Consolidated Bank Statistics 
 
 
Fig.25 Net cross-border claims, core to periphery 
Euro, bn Source: BIS Consolidated Bank Statistics 
 
 
The evidence presented here shows that exposure of core banks to 
peripheral countries increased considerably after the first signs of the 
international financial crisis in 2007. There are several probable reasons 
for this phenomenon. Core banks had no concerns about the 
creditworthiness of peripheral states until 2009, indeed lending to 
governments seemed a reasonable course of action. ECB policy, 
Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour 
6. The financial sector: How to create a global crisis and then benefit from it 
41 
 
furthermore, was to support all banks, thus increasing the 
creditworthiness of peripheral banks. Above all, money markets became 
very volatile after August 2007 and there were significant differences 
between individual inter-bank rates (LIBOR). Core banks found 
themselves holding surplus euros in 2007-8 and, given overall credit 
concerns, they perceived peripheral banks as safer than banks in other 
countries (especially the US and the UK).  While the Anglo-Saxon 
financial systems were already affected by the crisis, European countries 
appeared to be safer locations. This lack of concern with the European 
periphery can also be inferred from the Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
spreads shown in Figure 32, which were low and stable until mid 
September 2008 (when Lehman Brothers failed). Rising spreads in 
Greece and Portugal and a buoyant housing market in Spain appeared to 
offer high and reasonably secure returns to core banks.  
 Figure 26 below shows the gross exposure of the core countries 
compared to their Capital and Reserves. Additionally it shows the equity 
of the banking system at the end of 2008, which is the only date for 
which this type of data is available from the ECB or Eurosystem Central 
Banks. The graph shows that exposure of core banks to the periphery 
grew faster than their capital and reserves until early 2008. At that time 
banks began to reign in lending while continuing to strengthen their 
capital base. The main contributors to core lending to the periphery are 
France and Germany, whose trajectories are shown in figure 27. 
 
Fig. 26 Core bank gross claims on periphery vs. capital & reserves  
Euro, bn Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics; ECB Eurosystem Statistical Data Warehouse 
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Fig 27 French and German bank gross claims on periphery vs. 
capital & reserves 
Euro, bn Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics; ECB Eurosystem Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
 
The single point in figure 26 marks the equity of core banks in 
December 2008, allowing for visual assessment of exposure. At the end 
of 2008 the gross exposure of core banks to the periphery stood at 
around 1.4 trillion euros. Meanwhile, total equity of the core banking 
system was 0.6 trillion euro, making the exposure to peripheral countries 
approximately 2.6 times equity. The two single points in figure 27 
indicate the equity of French and German banks, respectively, in March 
2009. On this basis, the exposure of German banks appears perhaps 
somewhat heavier than that of French banks.   
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that core banks are heavily 
exposed to peripheral countries. Yet, the assets are loans and therefore it 
is probable that they are not entered on the balance sheet on a mark-to-
market basis, reflecting current market prices. Consequently, provision 
against losses will presumably take place only when the possibility of 
default by borrowers is very high, and the loans begin to look impaired. 
Judging by current Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads (fig. 32), which 
capture risk premia, the risk to core banks does not look forbidding at 
the moment.  
However, things could change very rapidly, if peripheral 
countries took a turn for the worse. A 10% drop in the value of banking 
assets would be serious for the core banking systems, but it may not 
necessarily be terminal. If, on the other hand, 50% of loans to the 
periphery defaulted with a 50% recovery ratio, resulting in a loss of 25% 
of total exposure; or equally, if an exit from the euro resulted in a 25% 
devaluation of domestic currencies, the outcome would be disastrous for 
the banking system of the core nations, given current levels of equity. 
German and French banks would be particularly vulnerable.   
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This is the hard reality behind the negotiations currently taking 
place between core and periphery regarding a rescue plan for the 
weakest, in the first instance, Greece. If the periphery was not rescued 
and generalised default occurred, the banking system of the core would 
find itself in a tight corner. Needless to say, banks have been rescued 
once in 2007-9, and it is likely that they would be rescued again.  
6.3 ECB operations allow banks to restrict their lending 
 
When the financial crisis hit in 2007, many European banks 
found that their assets were worth less than estimated. In the preceding 
period European banks had attempted to keep in step with large US 
banks by borrowing to acquire speculative mortgage-backed and other 
asset-backed securities, thus raising their returns. When the interbank 
market froze in 2007-8, European banks struggled to find liquidity, thus 
coming under heavy pressure.   
The most visible effect of this development in the money 
markets was the drastic widening of the LIBOR-OIS spreads. The 
LIBOR is a rate of interest closely linked to the interbank money market 
for maturities between 1 month and 1 year; the OIS (or EONIA in the 
Eurozone) relates to the rate of interest for overnight cash. The result of 
the freeze was a sharp increase in money market rates, while overnight 
rates remained largely unchanged. The situation worsened after Lehman 
Brothers collapsed in September 2008. To confront the problem, the 
ECB decided to increase its long-term refinancing operations. The 
expectation was that this would re-establish confidence in the money 
markets, as well as inducing banks to lend more freely beyond the 
interbank market.  
Fig. 28  Securities and Loans held by banks, cross-border positions 
Euro bn Source: ECB (2010) Monetary, financial markets and balance of payments statistics 
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Figure 28 shows that increased demand for liquidity by European 
banks resulted in a rising share of short-term assets on their balance 
sheets (represented here by securities up to 1 year). 14 At the same time, 
banks engaged in rapid restructuring of their balance sheets by reducing 
longer-term securities (securities of over 2 years) as well as loans. This is 
a characteristic feature of the general „deleveraging‟ in which banks have 
engaged across the world following the crisis. In the eurozone this 
process has rested on increased liquidity provision (in euros) by the 
ECB, in exchange for long-term assets held by banks. Technically, short-
term securities held by banks were increased as the ECB rapidly 
expanded its long-term refinancing operations (mostly securities with 
one year maturity, which is long for a central bank), as is shown in figure 
29:  
 
Fig. 29  Net central bank lending in the Eurosystem (main 
operations) 
Euro bn Source: ECB (2010) Monetary, financial markets and balance of payments statistics  
 
 
Intensified liquidity provision also took place by the national central 
banks of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. Liquid short-term securities 
were supplied to the domestic banks in the wake of open market 
operations during the crisis. Figure 29 further shows a significant 
increase in bank deposits held at the central bank during this time. Banks 
have preferred to hold some of their reserves at the central bank instead 
of boosting their lending or acquiring securities. This development has, 
in turn, reinforced the process of banking deleverage, thus restricting the 
supply of credit to the economy, and worsening the recession.  
 
                                                          
14
 Cross border positions are assumed to be a good proxy for the overall balance sheet of 
banks.  
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6.4 Sovereign debt rises 
 
Sovereign debt rose rapidly once the crisis had set in, as was discussed in 
section 5. The drop in output led to falling revenue, while expenditure 
rose chiefly to rescue the financial system. Figure 30 shows that 
sovereign debt rose slightly between September 2007 and September 
2008; the outstanding amount climbing from 4.9 trillion to 5.1 trillion 
euros. But after September 2008, when the banking crisis turned into a 
global crisis that damaged all sectors in the economy, sovereign debt rose 
by almost 900bn euros. The rise in public debt represents close to 60% 
of the entire increase in outstanding debt among all issuers in Europe, as 
is also shown in figure 30.  
 
Fig. 30  Total outstanding debt European markets 
Euro bn Source: ECB (2010) Monetary, financial markets and balance of payments statistics 
 
 
The immediate cause of the sovereign debt crisis is now clear: states have 
had to issue enormous amounts of debt at the „worst time‟, thus facing 
increases in yield (as reflected in CDS spreads). Banks reduced their 
lending in 2009 and switched to holding short-term securities. They also 
avoided issuing bonds in 2009, fully aware of the rising pressure in 
financial markets, and opting to issue equities as figure 31 shows. The 
stock market revived in 2009 due to government support for the 
financial system, thus banks could obtain funds cheaply. Non-banks 
were able to issue fresh debt at yields similar to the previous period 
because they have more flexible term structure and timing of issuance. 
The brunt of the crisis has been shifted onto the public sector.  
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Fig. 31 Net Issue of Securities 
Euro bn Source: ECB (2010) Monetary, financial markets and balance of payments statistics 
 
 
This outcome was facilitated by the ECB‟s response to the liquidity 
crunch which, as was shown above, was to flood the financial markets 
with liquidity in order to avert bank collapses. Co-ordinated action by the 
ECB allowed banks to start repairing their balance sheets. But ECB 
action helped to shift the problem onto the state, since the increase of 
ECB short-term securities made it more difficult for sovereigns to issue 
bonds, particularly as these have longer maturity. Furthermore, the ECB 
has extended the list of assets it accepts as collateral in liquidity 
operations by including further types of private securities. Currently 
government securities account for less than half of the nominal value of 
the securities on the list. Access to ECB liquidity facilities has thus been 
broadened for banks, negatively affecting demand for government 
securities. States have been left struggling to raise funds, pushing up 
refinancing costs. In the absence of unified fiscal policy in the eurozone, 
each state has competed against the others, leading to higher yields for 
peripheral bonds.  
The structural weaknesses of monetary union are apparent in this 
regard. All countries have the same access to the money markets; but 
they do not have the same access to credit, which is obtained at a 
different price by each country. The money market is unified in Europe 
as each domestic banking system has access to the ECB through national 
central banks, and faces the same interest rates and conditions. Bank 
nationality does not matter. However, in the government bond market 
each country faces particular conditions to refinance or issue debt. 
Supply and demand conditions - not to mention a country‟s credit rating 
- determine how much and at what price a country can borrow. The 
ECB does not act as government agent in managing public debt, 
highlighting the unique fiscal and monetary arrangement within the 
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eurozone. In effect, the ECB does not act as a genuine central bank since 
it supports banks within the eurozone, but lacks power to extend 
support to member states.  
6.5 A hothouse for speculation 
 
The reaction of financial markets to the unfolding conditions was 
to foster speculation. Two related trends have prevailed in outburst of 
speculation: the weakening of the euro, and the widening of both 
government bond and CDS spreads of peripherals versus the core.  
As national currencies no longer exist, it has not been possible 
for speculators to bet on a weakening of currencies due to public 
finances getting out of kilter. But selling the euro has been a win-win bet 
for speculators, and peripheral countries have been at the eye of the 
storm. From a speculator‟s perspective there are three main scenarios. 
First, one or several peripheral countries exit the eurozone, thus leaving 
the common currency in a much weaker position. Second, a bail-out of 
peripheral countries is agreed, even if it implies bending the rules of 
monetary union. This would in itself mean a loss of faith in the euro as a 
common currency. The third option, which might even lead to a 
strengthening of the euro, is for peripheral countries to adjust their 
economies. But this would mean tremendous fiscal tightening and 
austerity imposed across peripheral countries.   
The money markets have not provided a promising field for 
speculative activity. As was shown above, ECB policy has been to keep 
interest rates low and to continue with huge long-term refinancing 
operations. Thus, both the repo rate and the LIBOR-OIS spread have 
been at low levels since late 2009. Speculative attacks have focused on 
government bonds and CDS of peripheral countries versus the core. 
Greece has been hit harder, partly because of the lack of credibility as its 
accounts have been fiddled repeatedly, partly because of its large current 
account deficit, and partly because the relatively small size of its bond 
market makes it an easier target for speculation. 
 It is important to note that a considerable part of government 
bonds are held on an accrual basis. Consequently, despite its relatively 
small size, the CDS market has close similarities to the government bond 
market that is actively traded and marked-to-market. In addition, trading 
of sovereign CDS does not require a repo market or on-balance sheet 
reporting. As a result, CDSs have become another instrument for betting 
on a worsening of the crisis, or on outright default.  
As is apparent from the preceding sections of the report, the 
crisis has not been caused by the CDS market on public debt. However, 
the CDS market has recently emerged as a benchmark for measuring, 
trading and speculating against the risk of a country defaulting. Sovereign 
borrowers are not only judged by rating agencies, but also receive a 
market judgement on the risk of default through CDS. Conceptually, the 
CDS benchmark resembles an independent index. Governments, central 
banks, rating agencies, and so on, have been forced to follow CDS 
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spreads closely, making decisions accordingly. The CDS market might 
still be relatively small, but its impact is undoubtedly large. 
The CDS spreads shown in figure 32 reveal how the perception 
of the euro has changed in light of the crisis. Bank and corporate CDS 
spreads were hit hard during the initial phase of the crisis. But the 
second phase, which began in 2009, has been marked mainly by 
widening sovereign CDS spreads. This puts in better perspective the 
older arguments in favour of joining the euro, namely that it would not 
only reduce exchange rate volatility but also limit government funding 
costs. The assumption was that bond yields within the Eurozone would 
converge, as indeed they did for a period. But the crisis has shown that 
this argument is seriously flawed. The structural weaknesses of monetary 
union and the impact of the crisis have raised the debt servicing costs of 
peripheral countries. Speculators have acted as the trigger, and were able 
to profit from the difficulties of others as the ECB watched. The 
financial system was rescued by state intervention, only to turn and bite 
its rescuer. 
Fig 32 CDS spreads, 5 yrs 
Source: Bloomberg 
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7. Political economy of alternative strategies 
 
European monetary union has been problematic for peripheral countries, 
above all, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland. It has been no less 
problematic for working people in the core countries, with Germany in 
the lead. But Germany has also benefited at the expense of peripheral 
countries, mostly through entrenched current account surpluses that 
have been translated into capital flows to the rest of the eurozone. 
The sovereign debt crisis is the outcome of, first, precarious 
integration of peripheral countries in the eurozone and, second, the crisis 
of 2007-9. The public sector in peripheral countries has confronted an 
increased need of borrowing because it rescued finance while attempting 
to forestall deep recession. The weaknesses of integration subsequently 
provided a field for speculative attacks by financial capital. The ECB has 
had neither the means nor the inclination to confront speculators.  
The question now is: what strategies are available for peripheral 
countries? This is a huge topic that would merit separate study. 
However, on the basis of the preceding analysis, it is possible to sketch 
the broad outlines of alternatives. These could be split into three: first, 
imposing austerity on peripheral countries; second, seeking to alter the 
institutional structure of the eurozone; and third, exiting from the 
eurozone. 
7.1 Austerity, or imposing the costs on workers in peripheral 
countries 
 
The imposition of austerity is the currently prevalent policy in Greece 
and elsewhere. It is, after all, in line with the standard response to 
financial crises during the last three decades, typically overseen by the 
IMF. The normal terms of intervention by the IMF include the advance 
of a bridging loan to stabilise financial and foreign exchange markets, 
accompanied by „conditionality‟. The content of conditionality has 
changed over the years, and there is evidence that the IMF is even 
beginning to countenance some relaxation of its rules. 15 But broadly 
speaking it still amounts to austerity coupled with liberalisation of the 
economy.  
The problem with inviting the IMF to deal with Greece - and 
potentially others - is that the eurozone issues what purports to be the 
second ranking form of world money. The damage to the standing of the 
euro would be palpable. The first option for core countries, therefore, 
has been to foster austerity on the periphery, attempting to manage the 
process from within. However, the eurozone lacks well-established 
mechanisms through which to replicate the approach of the IMF. 
Providing bridging loans, for one thing, is expressly forbidden by the 
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 Blanchard, O., Della Ariccia G. and Mauro P. “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”, IMF Staff 
Position Note, 12 Feb 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1003.pdf  
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treaties establishing the euro. The result has been persistent political 
pressure on peripheral countries to adopt austerity policies, but without 
advancing the requisite finance. The costs of adjustment have been 
shifted disproportionately onto peripheral countries, inevitably leading to 
clashes of national interest. 
In this context, the governments of peripheral countries have 
begun to introduce austerity policies in the hope of bringing down 
borrowing costs in the open markets. The strategy was first adopted by 
Ireland, but then also by Portugal and Spain, and now with increasing 
alacrity by Greece. In effect, peripheral countries have been forced to 
adopt IMF conditionality, without the IMF loan.  
The Greek government, newly elected in October 2009, has 
introduced ever tougher austerity measures, including general reductions 
in public spending, direct cuts of public sector wages, and worsening of 
pension rights. The impact of these measures will inevitably spread to 
the private sector as employers take the opportunity to impose worse 
conditions on labour. The government has also imposed higher indirect 
taxes, while taking steps to reduce tax evasion.   
This approach has already been tried in Ireland, bringing down 
borrowing costs to a degree, as is shown by CDS spreads in figure 32, 
but will face more tribulations in Greece. The country‟s borrowing 
requirements are higher, and there has been a profound loss of 
credibility for the Greek state in financial markets. Furthermore, 
speculative fever is far more advanced in early 2010 compared to 2009, 
making it unlikely that speculators would desist for long. With good 
reason too, since the declared aim of the Greek government to reduce its 
budget deficit by 4% in the course of 2010 is implausible. Even worse, 
austerity measures would probably intensify the recession, bringing 
government revenues under further pressure and making the targets 
even harder.  
Greece has found itself in a very difficult position in early 2010: 
imposing cuts and raising taxes in order to pay high interest rates to 
buyers of its public debt. The country has been able to borrow 
commercially in January and March 2010, but the rate of interest was 
high on both occasions, well in excess of 6%. This represents a transfer 
of income on a grand scale from the many to the few. Greece has a 
substantial volume of debt to refinance in the rest of 2010. If 
commercial borrowing costs did not decline, it is apparent that the policy 
could not last for long, given the huge social costs involved. What the 
government would be cutting with one hand, it would be passing onto 
lenders with other. External help would then be necessary, which can 
come either from the eurozone, or from the IMF.  
The political economy of a eurozone loan, however, is far from 
simple. In the first instance, the constitution of the eurozone forbids 
formal advance of such loans. Yet, the EU has been highly inventive 
under pressure in the past. It might be possible, for instance, to make 
bilateral loans to Greece, possibly in the form of guarantees of Greek 
debt. The real difficulty, though, is not formal arrangements but political 
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relations within the eurozone. Germany, which will probably bear the 
main burden, has gone through sustained austerity for almost two 
decades. It has also expressly and repeatedly opposed the notion of 
bailing out states within the eurozone. There would be significant 
political costs for any German government in making money available to 
other states. Furthermore, lending to Greece might open the gates to 
other peripheral countries.  
On the other hand, there are significant risks to avoiding a 
euroloan and thus forcing Greece to go directly to the IMF. Technically 
the country would remain within the euro, particularly as there are no 
legal mechanisms to force it out. But its membership would in effect 
become second tier, and the long-term implications for its ability to 
borrow at standard sovereign rates within the eurozone would be entirely 
unclear. More significantly, going to the IMF would create a precedent 
for other peripheral countries, and might invite further speculative 
attacks. The risks posed for the euro as world money would be 
multiplied, particularly given the high exposure of core banks to 
peripheral countries.  
The Greek ruling establishment is fully aware of these 
complexities. Though its preferred choice has been to tie its mast to a 
„European‟ solution, it has also raised the threat of unilaterally going to 
the IMF. On the whole, the dominant opinion has been that the country 
needs to do whatever it takes in order to remain within the euro. 
Nevertheless, austerity imposed from the top is likely to be met with stiff 
resistance from trade unions, popular organisations, and political parties. 
Greece will be wracked by political strife in the coming period. The 
government will probably draw some support from widespread popular 
fear of national bankruptcy as well as from (misplaced) national pride in 
remaining a member of the „rich club‟ of the euro.  
The deeper weakness of the current strategy, however, is neither 
the imposition of austerity on working people, nor the difficulty of 
securing bridging loans. It is, rather, that its prospects of dealing with the 
underlying causes of the crisis are minimal. As was shown above, the 
underlying structural problem of the eurozone is that German 
competitiveness has surged ahead during the last decade. Greece and 
other peripheral countries have not succeeded in raising productivity 
sufficiently to overcome the pressure that Germany has applied onto its 
workers.  
A policy of austerity would do very little to tackle the underlying 
problem of competitiveness. It might succeed in lowering nominal and 
real wages for a period, but it is apparent that this cannot be a long-term 
competitiveness strategy for countries that already have substantially 
lower wages than Germany. Given the flatness of German nominal 
remuneration, it would simply mean falling wages for years ahead. The 
answer, then, must be policies to raise productivity, and in this regard the 
ideas that typically accompany such IMF-related packages are disastrous.  
The standard prescription, still touted after persistent failure, is 
liberalisation. In the context of the eurozone, it would amount to the full 
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unfolding, and even intensification, of the underlying ideas of the 
European Employment Strategy. Key elements might be: further 
weakening of labour protection, particularly through reducing trade 
union power; abolishing collective bargaining on wages; facilitating the 
entry of women into the labour force, especially in part-time and 
temporary jobs; removal of barriers into certain closed professions; 
reducing the tax burden on capital by introducing heavier indirect taxes; 
introducing privatisation into the education system; and significantly 
raising the pension age, while facilitating a funded system that promotes 
the activities of financial institutions. 
There is no reason to think that such measures, or similar, would 
lead to sustained growth of productivity, allowing for genuine 
convergence toward the countries of the core. Productivity growth 
requires investment, new technologies, and opening fresh fields of 
activity. In the case of Greece it also means moving the country away 
from a pattern of growth that has rested on consumption with rising 
household debt. These changes will not come from liberalising markets, 
and nor is there any evidence that Greek capitalists have the capacity to 
perform such a miracle. In the medium term liberalisation measures are 
likely to lead to stagnation, with systematic transfers of income from 
labour to capital. Meanwhile, Greek society - the second most unequal 
within the eurozone - is likely to become even more polarised and 
callous toward social deprivation. The policy of remaining within the 
eurozone at all costs is likely to have grim results.   
7.2 Reform of the eurozone: Aiming for a ‘good euro’ 
 
The second alternative involves making structural changes to the 
institutional arrangements of the eurozone. A distinction should be 
drawn here between, on the one hand, reforms that would not alter the 
fundamental character of the eurozone and, on the other, reforms that 
would go against economic and social relations at the heart of the 
monetary union. 
 The former have been extensively discussed in the academic 
literature as well as in the popular press. 16 There is, after all, manifest 
failure of the institutions of the eurozone, extensively discussed in the 
earlier parts of the report. Above all, there is a disjuncture between 
unitary monetary policy and fragmented fiscal policy. The rules under 
which the ECB operates are unnecessarily restrictive, including exclusive 
focus on inflation targeting and forbidding the acquisition of public debt. 
Furthermore, there is no provision for centralised fiscal transfers that 
could alleviate some of the tensions created by the single monetary 
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 For a critical perspective, see: Arestis, P. and M. Sawyer (eds.). 2006.  Alternative 
Perspectives on Economic Policies in the European Union, Palgrave/Macmillan. For reform 
that aims to maintains the eurozone status quo see Gros, D. and  Mayer T. 2010. “Towards a 
Euro(pean) Monetary Fund”, Centre for European Policy Studies, 8 Feb,  
http://www.ceps.eu/book/towards-european-monetary-fund.  Gros and Mayer’s arguments 
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policy. There is also lack of an established mechanism of fiscal 
intervention in crises, as became apparent during 2007-9, when each 
nation state was left to fend for itself in its domestic economy. The 
absence of such a mechanism became even clearer in 2010 as Greece 
neared bankruptcy. 
 There is nothing in principle to stop the gradual introduction of 
some of these reforms in the future. It is possible, for instance, for the 
eurozone to develop a properly functioning Public Debt Office that 
could coordinate the issuing and handling of public debt in cooperation 
with the ECB. It is also possible for the rules applying to the ECB to be 
relaxed, for instance, allowing the ECB to acquire state debt directly and 
thus more closely resembling a normal central bank. Perhaps the ECB 
might be supplemented by a European Monetary Fund that would lend 
to eurozone states facing crises on the basis of established proportional 
rights. It is even conceivable that a centralised system of fiscal transfers 
might be established within the eurozone. 
 It is, however, extremely unlikely that fiscal policy could become 
unified as that would amount to wholesale restructuring of sovereignty 
across the eurozone. There is a hierarchy of states within the eurozone 
and close calculation of national interest. Legitimacy for each state 
derives from its own history, but also from the structures of power and 
popular assent, including democratic elections. There is no prospect of a 
single European state, and hence no prospect of unified fiscal policy. 
The reforms that could take place would occur within an existing 
hierarchy of power, dominated by the core countries and Germany.  
 Consequently, such reforms would amount, at most, to palliative 
adjustments of fiscal policy and improved articulation of fiscal with 
monetary policy. For the same reason, they are unlikely to challenge 
directly the principles encapsulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability 
Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, that is, fiscal and monetary conservatism 
which shifts the pressure of competitive adjustment onto workers. 
 Even so, there is a risk that mild reforms would lead to lower 
acceptability of the euro internationally, hence a drop in its value relative 
to the dollar. But if the underlying principles of monetary union were not 
challenged, this development might be acceptable to the core of the 
eurozone. It is conceivable that a slightly weaker euro backed by 
reformed, yet still tough, mechanisms of fiscal and monetary control 
would be attractive to Berlin and others. If such a configuration could be 
achieved, Germany would still maintain its current account surplus 
within the eurozone, the external terms of trade would improve, and the 
role of the euro as world reserve currency might not be compromised.  
For peripheral countries and workers across the eurozone, such a 
prospect holds little attraction. German workers would continue to be 
squeezed, and peripheral countries would continue to generate deficits. 
Germany would not shift from its path of stagnation, while the 
economies of peripheral countries would remain precariously integrated 
into the eurozone. The difference would be occasional fiscal hand-outs 
to relieve tensions, and perhaps improved management of crises.  
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 It is not surprising, therefore, that, there has been a search for 
more radical reforms particularly by sections of the European Left in 
peripheral but also core countries. An important aim has been to push 
for further fiscal transformation seeking the abolition of the Stability 
Pact. What would then follow is not entirely clear, but the presumption 
is that there would be greater fiscal independence for each state, 
including the ability to determine budgets and national debt, but still 
coordinated by new European institutional arrangements.  
Coordination would be reinforced by the European budget, 
which would be enlarged from its currently tiny size to perhaps 5-6% of 
the GDP of the EU. Coordination would also presumably benefit from 
sustained intervention by the European Investment Bank. Scope might 
thus be provided to promote ecologically sound, socially inclusive and 
redistributive public investment programmes. These would be capable of 
counter-balancing existing asymmetries in European development.  
The European Employment Strategy would also be abandoned 
in preference to coordinated policies that protected labour conditions 
and income. A European Minimum Wage Policy (corresponding to at 
least 60% of the median wage of each country) could be instigated. This 
would be combined with legislation to enforce progressive working time 
regulation across Europe. There could also be European wage 
coordination mechanisms that would take into account productivity 
gains, inflation, and unemployment. Stabilisation of labour shares in 
output (from the bottom up) might narrow the differentials in 
competitiveness that underlie the current crisis. Finally, there could be 
Europe-wide unemployment insurance, perhaps financed by progressive 
income taxes. These measures are expected to promote integration of 
the European economy that would be beneficial to workers.  
A notable feature of such proposals is that they do not confront 
directly the coordination of looser fiscal policy with a single monetary 
policy and the implications for the practices of the ECB. The general 
presumption is that the monetary union would be preserved, but the 
statutes of the ECB would be changed, ending its undemocratic political 
independence, and allowing for easier provision of credit to states and 
financial systems. This approach might thus be termed the „good euro‟. 
Monetary union would be supplemented by institutional reforms that 
would make the currency operate in favour of working people, 
particularly in small economies where the scope for an autonomous 
economic policy might be narrow. This strategy also appears to provide a 
political platform to unite working people in core and peripheral 
countries. However, the „good euro‟ also faces intrinsic problems in 
achieving its aims. 
 Set aside for a moment the political difficulties of coordinating 
popular pressure across several eurozone countries in order to abolish 
the Stability Pact in the face of bitter opposition by the existing order. 
An underlying economic problem is that the reforms would abandon 
fiscal discipline while still attempting to maintain the euro as domestic 
and world money. This would be implausible for a currency that 
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attempted to compete with the dollar. The result would probably be a 
fall in the value of the euro, making it impossible for large eurozone 
banks to operate internationally. There would also be speculative attacks 
on the debt of the countries with the largest deficits within the eurozone.  
A common currency area, especially one that purported to issue 
world money, could not tolerate large and variable fiscal deficits among 
its constituent parts. It is not apparent that the eurozone could continue 
to issue a form of world money, while allowing for substantial fiscal 
independence among its member states. An enlarged European budget 
would be no answer for this problem, much as it might contribute to 
redistributive policies. The real answer would be to have a European 
budget run by a unitary state with a sufficiently integrated presence 
across the eurozone to support a common currency. But for that to 
happen, the present institutional and political arrangements of the 
eurozone would have to be overturned.  
There is no parallel between the USA and the eurozone in this 
respect. It is true that the USA has a federal structure that allows 
individual states to manage their own fiscal affairs with several degrees of 
freedom. But the US federal state is a unitary entity that provides the 
ultimate guarantee for all public debt. California might be running huge 
deficits, but the federal state is perceived to be the implicit guarantor of 
its debt. No state could play that role within the eurozone, and there is 
no prospect of one emerging. Furthermore, the US is a well-understood 
exception in international transactions. The dollar is already world 
money, and can therefore tolerate falls in its value without necessarily 
losing acceptability – always within limits. The euro is attempting to 
establish a similar role for itself, and has no comparable track record.  
In other words, the strategy of radical reforms aiming at a „good 
euro‟ does not face simply political problems, namely the enormous 
difficulties of constructing an alliance that could alter the structure of the 
eurozone. More fundamentally, it faces the problem of compatibility of 
means with ends. Radical reform in the fiscal sphere would probably lead 
to failure of the monetary union altogether as the international role of 
the euro would come under pressure.  
Those who call for such reforms should be aware of what they 
are advocating and tailor their proposals accordingly. The nub of the 
issue is neither the abolition of the Stability Pact, nor the introduction of 
an expanded European Budget with a redistributive mandate. It is, 
rather, the compatibility of fiscal independence, and possibly rising 
public debt, with the international role of the euro. On these grounds, it 
is possible that radical reform would lead to collapse of monetary union. 
If such a step is not to result in chaos, it would require coherent social 
and economic transformation of national economies, including the 
monetary system. To put it differently, a „good euro‟ might well lead to 
„no euro‟ thus requiring profound transformation of European economy 
and society. 
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7.3 Exit from the eurozone: Radical social and economic change  
 
The final alternative of exit from the eurozone is the great 
unmentionable in peripheral countries, or referred to as the ultimate 
horror by governments and the press. There is no doubt that it would 
have severe consequences. But note that influential economists in the 
Anglo-Saxon world have already raised the issue in the press. Thus, 
Goodhart has effectively proposed the reintroduction of the drachma for 
domestic purposes, which would in practice result in devaluation. 17 
Feldstein has recommended a short „holiday‟ of Greece from the 
eurozone, returning at a lower exchange rate. 18 The underlying logic of 
these proposals is clear: the problem originates in loss of 
competitiveness, which can be partly tackled through devaluation. 
 The suggestions made by Goodhart and Feldstein could be called 
„conservative exit‟. In effect, conservative exit would operate as 
complement to the usual IMF package by also allowing for devaluation, 
which is currently impossible. Austerity would still be imposed, but some 
of the pressure of adjustment would be taken by the fall in the exchange 
rate. Competitiveness would be partly revived, strengthening export 
demand. Liberalisation measures would presumably follow in order to 
improve long-term competitiveness. 
Devaluation would have costs for workers since real wages 
would fall to the degree to which tradeables entered the wage basket. But 
there would also be costs for sections of the capitalist class, particularly 
those servicing debt abroad, including corporations and banks. Cessation 
of payments and restructuring of international debt might become 
necessary. It is no wonder, therefore, that ruling elites in peripheral 
countries are reluctant to consider this option.  
The prospect is particularly forbidding for „little‟ Greece and 
Portugal as their ruling elites are aware of their own impotence to 
confront the problem in its full complexity. Conservative exit would not 
by itself deal with the longer-term challenge of raising productivity 
growth and altering deficient economic structures. It would merely 
change the terms of trade, encouraging production of tradeables and 
potentially shifting the economy away from non-tradeables. It would 
then be up to domestic capitalists to grasp this opportunity to restructure 
production, expand investment, and develop new fields of activity. The 
free market would have to generate a burst of productive dynamism, if 
the underlying problem is to be resolved. 
There is no evidence that capitalists in peripheral countries could 
perform such a miracle. The task is particularly complicated because 
peripheral countries typically have productive structures of intermediate 
technology, while real wages are above those of competitors in Asia and 
elsewhere. There is a risk, therefore, that conservative exit coupled with 
liberalisation would lead to protracted stagnation accompanied by bouts 
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of inflation, successive devaluations, and slow erosion of labour income. 
Hence the ruling elites in the periphery generally prefer the option of 
remaining within the eurozone and shifting the costs onto working 
people. 
 This leaves the option of „progressive exit‟ from the eurozone, 
that is, exit conditional on radical restructuring of economy and society. 
As has already been noted, exit would involve a substantial economic 
shock. There would be devaluation, which would release some of the 
pressure of adjustment by improving the balance of trade, but would also 
make it impossible to service external debt. Cessation of payments and 
restructuring of debt would be necessary. Access to international capital 
markets would become extremely difficult. Banks would come under 
heavy pressure, facing bankruptcy. The point is, however, that these 
problems do not have to be confronted in the standard conservative 
way.  
Economic survival could be ensured, and a sustainable path of 
growth could be achieved, provided there was drastic economic and 
social transformation. For that it would be necessary to mobilise broader 
social forces capable of taking economic measures that would shift the 
balance of power in favour of labour. This is not the place to discuss in 
detail the policy that might bring about such change. But some strategic 
steps are clear, including the following.  
To protect the banking system it would be necessary to engage in 
nationalisation, creating a system of public banks. Private banking in 
mature countries has failed systemically in 2007-9. Bank failure has 
threatened the provision of liquidity across the economy. Furthermore, 
large private banks – or Large Complex Financial Institutions – have 
proven „too big to fail‟ in the EU and the USA. This has created major 
problems of moral hazard, effectively subsidising the cost of capital of 
large banks. Large banks currently offer expensive credit to households, 
while reducing loans to small and medium enterprises. They also engage 
in complex and often speculative transactions in open markets, of 
negligible economic and social value.  
Placing large banks under public banks would guarantee deposits. 
Further, it would advance credit on reasonable terms to small and 
medium enterprises, thus protecting employment. Public banks would 
also contribute to attaining sustained growth, as well as beginning to 
reverse the financialisation of contemporary economies. Co-operative 
and not-for-profit institutions have been long-standing elements of 
advanced financial systems. Public ownership and control over large 
banks is a step that could draw on extensive public knowledge and 
experience.  
 Capital controls would also be necessary, in the first instance to 
prevent the outflow of liquid funds and protect the banking system. 
More broadly, regulation of external capital flows would be required to 
marshal national resources. Managing capital flows is also necessary to 
avoid importing instability from abroad, as even the IMF appears to 
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recognise of late.19 The policy of freeing the capital account in recent 
decades has offered no growth advantages, while regularly generating 
crises.  
The combination of public banking and controls over the capital 
account would immediately pose the question of public ownership over 
other areas of the economy. The underlying weaknesses of productivity 
and competitiveness already threaten the viability of entire areas of 
economic activity in peripheral countries. Public ownership would be 
necessary to prevent collapse. The specific sectors taken under public 
ownership, and even the form of public ownership itself, would depend 
on the characteristics of each country. But public utilities, transport, 
energy, and telecommunications would be prime candidates, at the very 
least in order to support the rest of economic activity.  
With significant areas of economic activity under public 
ownership and control, the rest of the economy could be shifted onto a 
different growth path. To that purpose it would be necessary to 
introduce industrial policy. Public institutions and mechanisms of 
promoting development, which have been steadily abolished in the years 
since the Maastricht Treaty, would be rebuild on a new basis. In 
conjunction with a public banking system, they would make it possible to 
implement a national programme of public and private investment. 
There is growth potential across peripheral countries for clean energy 
production, more energy-efficient homes and transport, as well as 
improved water quality and rubbish disposal. There is also scope for 
public investment in housing, urban planning, roads, railways, bridges, 
and airports. There is, finally, scope for the much more difficult task of 
improving technology as well as research and development.  
 Progressive exit for peripheral countries would be predicated on 
genuine structural reform of economy and society. Such change has 
nothing to do with the tired shibboleths of liberalisation. If productivity 
is to be set on an upward path, peripheral economies have to be weaned 
away from consumption, low savings, individual borrowing, low 
investment, and speculative bubbles. Structural change requires public 
mechanisms that could mobilise available resources for investment. It 
also requires transforming education by committing additional resources 
and expanding its reach to the poorest. Improving education would, in 
time, produce gains in labour skills, thus also benefiting productivity.   
 It is apparent that structural change of this order cannot be 
undertaken using the present inefficient and corrupt mechanisms of 
state. Broad political and social alliances are necessary to rebuild the 
structures of state on the basis of grass-roots control, transparency and 
accountability. On these grounds, the tax base would be broadened by 
taxing income, wealth and capital, while reducing indirect taxes. Steps 
would be taken to improve social provision of health and to reorganise 
the system of public pensions. Transfer payments would also be used 
                                                          
19
 Ostry, J. et al. “Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls”, IMF Staff Position Note, 19 Feb 2010. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1004.pdf 
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directly to tackle inequality in peripheral countries, which is already the 
worst in the eurozone. 
 The political and social alliances that could deliver such change 
do not exist in eurozone countries at present, other than in potential 
form. It would be far from easy to make them real, particularly as 
shifting the balance of power in favour of labour is predicated upon 
democratic organisation of economy and society. But there is no reason 
to believe that, if a credible political force proposed it within peripheral 
countries, it would be impossible for progressive exit to win broad 
support. 
Political difficulties aside, however, the strategy would also have 
to confront the deeper problem of attaining national development in a 
globalised economy. Progressive exit cannot be national autarky. It 
would be necessary for peripheral countries to maintain access to 
international trade, particularly within the EU. It would also be necessary 
to seek technology transfer and capital from abroad. There are no 
guarantees that such flows would be forthcoming, particularly as the 
established order in Europe would be hostile to radical change. But 
progressive exit also offers the prospect of different development for 
workers in the core countries, who have come under heavy pressure 
during the last two decades. Labour in core countries would be a natural 
ally of peripheral countries attempting a radical transformation of 
economy. And if the eurozone came apart in the periphery, it could also 
unravel at the core, allowing for genuinely cooperative relations among 
European countries. 
 To recap, peripheral countries are currently confronted with 
stark choices because of the crisis of 2007-9 and the structural 
weaknesses of the eurozone. The current crisis could be resolved in a 
way that served the interests of the social layers which created the 
disaster in the first place. This solution would involve austerity in an 
attempt to remain within the eurozone. It would be inequitable, 
imposing huge costs on working people, who are not to blame for the 
upheaval. It would also lead to a hardening of society, while probably 
failing to deliver growth and higher real incomes in the future. 
Alternatively, there could be a solution that changed the current 
balance of social forces in Europe involving institutional and social 
transformation. In this regard there is debate between those who would 
attempt to change the institutional arrangements of the eurozone, and 
those who would advocate exit from the eurozone coupled with 
transformation of economy and society. There would be costs to any 
form of radical strategy, to be sure, but they would be borne equitably. 
Unlike the option of austerity, furthermore, radical change would have 
the potential to put the economy on a sustainable path of development 
that produced benefits for all. The choice belongs to society and, as 
always, depends on struggle.  
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